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Preface 
 
This report was commissioned to inform interventions in support of processes of sector 
strategy initiated under the EU funded All ACP Agricultural Commodities Programme.  
 
More specifically, the purpose of this report is to review existing organizational forms of 
smallholder farmers’ associations and their contractual relationships with other market 
participants considering the prevailing structure of sectoral value chains, drawing on 
various types of academic and other literature and experiences of project initiatives and 
policy interventions across a range of countries and sectors in the East and Southern 
African ACP region.  
 
In association with a related assessment of alternative mechanisms of state support to 
value chain development (see AAACP Paper Series No. 9), the review serves as a 
contribution towards the fulfilment of two key outputs specified in the project logframe 
of the EU AAACP, namely:(a) synthesis of options and diagnosis of the commodity chains 
and livelihood systems analysis results; and (b) elaboration on the incorporation of 
relevant strategy recommendations and action plans into national development plans 
and policies in country specific cases.   
 
In practical terms, the two studies will form a basis of recommendations focussed on 
ensure smallholder farmer participation in, and benefit from, the processes of value 
chain development underway in the cassava sector in Zambia under the EU AAACP. 
 
The key insights from the experiences reviewed have been developed within a 
framework utilising transaction cost thinking and concepts from the organisation and 
business development literature. They illustrate how, in African agricultural markets, 
‘institutional innovation’ is needed in respect of new ‘rules of the game’, and also new 
types of organisation, ie ‘new players in the game’, both within rural areas and also for 
linking rural supply and urban consumption.  
 
The study argues that it is often small-scale institutional innovations in local market 
organisation and other non-price factors that are likely to stimulate smallholder 
participation in markets, particularly for staple foods in Africa. Efficient market 
organisation not only involves more but also better linkages between different economic 
players, which in turn require investment in various forms of human and social capital.  
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On this basis, the report suggests that the international donor community can play a key 
role in system or sector-wide initiatives. Besides encouraging institutional innovations, 
specific investments in human and social capital and business and sectoral organisation 
are also needed to enable new ways of organising people and markets to work for the 
poor - including agricultural smallholder collective enterprise. 
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Executive Summary 
Considerable changes have occurred in the global agricultural economy over the past 
decade. Growing urban demand in developing countries, greater influence of the private 
sector in linking smallholder farmers to more dynamic markets, increasingly vertically 
coordinated supply chains, a recognised need to support smallholders as a means of 
tackling poverty, and more stringent food safety standards are just a few of the issues. 
The recent dramatic food price increases have been attributed by commentators to a 
variety of sources – poor harvests in major producing regions, low stocks, depreciation 
of the US dollar, financial speculation, inappropriate energy policies and diversion of 
agricultural production into biofuels, other linkages to non-agricultural trade and 
investment patterns. The rise of agricultural sector superpowers, such as some South 
American countries in grains, sugar cane and other global commodities, has made 
international markets more competitive. Climate change is already posing agroclimatic 
challenges, and the probability of more severe impacts in the near future will exacerbate 
the threats to producer livelihoods, particularly in marginal regions of developing 
countries. Also, HIV/AIDS and migration are having complex effects on rural economies, 
not just changing the patterns of demand. Are smallholder farmers’ associations yet 
another problem, or are they part of the solution to rural poverty? 
 
Often it is small-scale institutional innovations in local market organisation that are likely 
to stimulate smallholder participation in input and output markets, particularly in staple 
foods markets in Africa. ‘Institutional innovation’ is needed in respect of new ‘rules of the 
game’ and new types of organisation, ie ‘new players in the game’, within rural areas 
and also for linking rural supply and urban consumption. So, too, are specific 
investments in human and social capital and business and market organisation: new 
ways of organising both people and markets to work for the poor. Nevertheless, a 
resurgence of interest in farmer organisation, although coming at a time when there are 
renewed goals for agriculture and the rural sector, is surprising: there has been a history 
of organisational failure in many developing regions over the last two or three decades.  
 
A review of literature and experiences is timely: in order to look to the future, there is a 
need to understand existing organisational forms of smallholder farmers’ associations 
and their contractual relationships with other market participants within the context of 
prevailing sectoral value chains in the East and Southern Africa ACP region. Specific 
examples of smallholder farmers’ associations and their contractual arrangements are 
considered in this report. In the light of changing global contexts, we seek to provide 
some indication of best practice for policy on smallholder farmer associations to guide 
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poverty reduction policies through potential intervention strategies for specific products 
and markets. 
 
The fundamental question is how can better organisation of people and markets reduce 
hunger, improve rural market performance and contribute to wider economic growth? 
The report tackles a series of issues concerning collective economic organisation in Africa. 
Potential unrealised? 
The historical outline of farmer associations in Africa that follows illustrates the diversity 
of group types, ranging from small informal farmer groups to large, tiered farmer 
cooperatives, different sources and levels of initiatives and interventions, a variety of 
contexts, and changing policy approaches. A persistent theme in the literature is that 
farmer groups: 
• Lack capital to grow in scale and complexity, particularly investment in physical assets 
for value addition through processing and manufacturing; 
• Lack management capacity and good organisational governance; 
• Compete in markets against economic forces that confound their traditionally 
bureaucratic and unresponsive structures and strategies. 
 
Besides internal organisational weaknesses and the lack of market competitiveness, 
unstable agricultural policies have created a disempowering external environment. As a 
result, in general neither statutory nor voluntary forms of association and collective 
enterprise have generated significant and sustainable agribusinesses in Africa. 
Collective organisation: can it contribute to more equitable and efficient markets? 
There are theoretical explanations of the failures of collective organisation but at the 
same time, the fundamental reasons for collaborating hold true: the potential for 
exploiting production and managerial economies of scale, overcoming market entry 
barriers, reducing transaction costs and cultivating supply chain relationships. Collective 
decision making may be cumbersome, and top-down decision making may be 
undesirable. But new forms of collective enterprise illustrate that innovative business 
models can work: ‘new generation cooperatives’ may provide solutions to some of the 
historical and structural problems of cooperatives. There are alternative management 
structures and financial resources - either philanthropic support; or external equity 
investment with a capacity to exert leverage through management building; or 
invitations to bondholders with a financial stake but without governance rights. These 
strategies offer the possibility of external capitalisation without diluting membership 
control. 
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Despite a history of operational failure, statutory arrangements such as levies and 
marketing boards are also mechanisms with potential to overcome market failures and 
the provision of public goods. Also, much may be learnt also from experiences elsewhere, 
such as the ‘interprofessional’ model for sectoral vertical and horizontal coordination. 
Can African cooperatives work? 
Traditional cooperative organisations do not easily deliver on social as well as economic 
objectives, and social policy is better separated from enterprise policy. Supply chain 
linkages can deliver on social and environmental management responsibilities, but these 
are often mediated by donors, NGOs and philanthropic organisations, and are linked to 
niche and vulnerable markets inaccessible to the majority of smallholders. Smallholder 
associations have a potentially valuable advocacy role in politics, but the converse is not 
true: political subversion leads to inequity and inefficiency. However, sufficient examples 
of successful formal cooperatives exist – or more broadly, collective enterprise – to 
argue that collective ways of organising agricultural marketing can work in Africa. Many 
features may differentiate the successes from the failures, but it is uncontroversial to 
state that marketing organisations must be entrepreneurial. The essential skills may not 
exist at grassroots level, but organisational hierarchies such as ‘tiered’ cooperatives can 
source external management input and equal private sector performance, by forming 
commercial subsidiaries that permit organisations to retain cooperative principles. 
 
The approach of external supporting organisations must be patient and realistic. 
Collective enterprise may not always work because usually there are threshold levels of 
asset requirements and of external support for successful group formation and operation. 
It is clear that collective enterprises are ‘organic’: they learn and grow, sometimes fail, 
and sometimes need to rise from the ashes of incompetence and corruption. The path to 
maturity is usually long, and needs supportive investment through a range of planned 
and sequenced business services, with an exit strategy emplaced to ensure progress 
towards sustainability. And there is no ‘one size-fits all’, and no guarantee that individual 
successes can be upscaled and replicated. 
 
The bulk of evidence so far shows that it is the agricultural middle class who are the 
growers of high value, highly specified products. While the poor can still benefit through 
economic multipliers, other approaches and other local, staples markets matter to most 
African smallholders. Nevertheless, it is possible that such caution reflects a lack of 
innovative approaches by researchers and development workers to organisational 
development and supply chain linkages.  
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What part does the institutional framework play? 
The importance of the historical, political and market context within which smallholder 
enterprise operates is clear. Institutions frame the relationship between state and the 
‘citizen’ and ‘organisations’, mediating the flows of technical support towards the 
grassroots, and advocacy towards the state, and the relationship of politics to local 
development processes. The purpose of the formal legal and regulatory framework, such 
as competition and business laws and cooperative laws is, in part, to shape the 
environment and enable business to operate effectively. This may or may not happen in 
practice: producer organisations often are surrounded by legal restrictions, and micro-, 
small and medium-sized enterprises often go unrecognised by the state as policy 
stakeholders. Where sectoral policy is increasingly directed towards scale, efficiency and 
new technologies to address food security objectives for growing populations in an era of 
climate change and social transformations, the needs of smallholders may be 
unrecognised and underprovided. Weaknesses in transport systems and infrastructure, 
and certain restrictive trade practices within and between African countries also impose 
heavy burdens on local or regional trade. Such formal business and legal frameworks, 
policies and priorities are critical to economic empowerment of the rural poor. Direct 
intervention should have a ‘light’, ‘enabling’ touch: correcting specific market failures, 
without otherwise intervening in commercial chain activities. 
 
Empowering collective organisations requires ‘voice’ to countervail urban biases. 
Institutional innovations envisaged to re-vitalise or re-envision collective enterprise 
include new rural and cooperative business models that may require new legislation. 
Innovation must be informed by, adapted and implemented by knowledgeable 
stakeholders, specialists and entrepreneurs who understand the realities of collective 
farmer organisation: above all, farmers must participate. To some extent these players 
must be arbitrageurs of stakeholder relations between the rural sector and government 
officials who may have limited awareness of participatory process, of the complex 
operations of cooperatives and rural business activities. New specialist structures may be 
needed to undertake this role, cutting across disciplines and organisations and relevant 
ministries; specialised organisations can be contracted from the private sector and civil 
society to link central policy and procedures with practice at the periphery. 
What part do international donors play? 
Most successful cases of collective enterprise creation have depended on a substantial 
degree of intervention from NGOs and international donors. The challenge is to move 
beyond ‘point’ or individual interventions to ‘system’ changes, initiatives that address 
sectoral weaknesses and market and public sector failures. Sectoral investment 
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approaches can be used by international donors who may have comparative advantage 
in attracting interest and commitments from the range of supply chain or network 
players: research and development, input suppliers, producers and downstream traders, 
processors, manufacturers and retailers. International donors can best employ their 
financial and human resources to address sectoral failures that cannot be addressed by 
the state or the private sector. They can also exploit a comparative advantage in ‘trust’, 
a potentially more objective analysis and less conflicting incentive structure than the 
state and possibly some civil society organisations. 
How can agribusiness reduce poverty? 
Sufficient examples of successful collective and collaborative supply chain enterprise 
exist to provide reassurance that private sector linkages can engage smallholders in 
markets. Yet, as noted, these are most likely to reach the agricultural middle class, and 
the rural poor may be only indirect beneficiaries through labour markets and other 
multipliers such as services and downstream industry. Nevertheless, the private sector 
processing, manufacturing and distribution sectors need raw materials, and commercial 
linkages can be formed on satisfactory terms. Partnership programmes can provide the 
essential capacity building to create viable business relationships in competitive markets. 
 
Private firms do exercise corporate social and environmental responsibility, and valuable 
examples from major agrifood firms are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it 
is not philanthropy but profitability that drives the private sector. Agribusiness 
partnership programmes cannot necessarily be mainstreamed. Where commercial 
linkages work, donors and the state should not crowd out the private sector. 
What sort of markets matter to African smallholders? 
The real challenge for pro-poor development initiatives is to reach the poorest 
(agriculture-dependent) smallholders with the lowest level of household assets who 
cannot easily turn to income earning opportunities other than agriculture. It is the 
domestic markets for lower value and bulk commodities such as staple products that are 
most closely linked to poverty, under-nutrition and ill-health in East and Southern 
African countries. These markets have been less touched by programmes and projects. 
For many African smallholders, such domestic markets are much more important than 
export markets, even if they are not so politically attractive to donors and NGOs.  
Equitable rural development may be best stimulated through sectoral intervention in 
bulk pro-poor products and commodities that are produced, traded and consumed locally, 
giving rise to broader economic multipliers – staples such as cereals and root crops, and 
other fruits and vegetable for which local markets already exist or have been developed. 
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1 Introduction 
Considerable changes have occurred in the global agricultural economy over the past 
decade, with even more dramatic market changes in the past two years. Among the 
pressing problems, poverty remains endemic and persistent. The food price problem is 
not over (FAO 2008; FAO 2008); and the new scramble for African resources including 
agricultural lands and water is under way. The need for a global agricultural supply-led 
response has been articulated recently by Piesse and Thirtle (2009). Nor is the food 
availability problem over. Investments in agricultural research and the development of 
new technologies have had ‘proven successes’ during the past 50 years (Spielman, D. J. 
and Pandya-Lorch, R. 2009), and the capacity of the productive sector to respond is not 
in doubt (Agrimonde® 2009; FAO 2009). Nevertheless, political will to make the 
necessary investments in agricultural research is lacking. Moreover, investments in 
agricultural research and production require complementary investments in processing, 
marketing and distribution: investments in rural energy, water supplies, information, 
communications and logistical infrastructure are necessary to reduce transformation and 
transaction costs (North, D. C. 1990).  
1.1 The development potential of better market organisation 
Often it is small-scale institutional innovations in local market organisation and other 
non-price factors, rather than ‘macro’ trade and price policies, that are likely to stimulate 
smallholder participation in input and output markets, particularly in staple foods 
markets in Africa (Alene, A. D., Manyong, V. M., Omanya, G., Mignouna, H. D., Bokanga, 
M. and Odhiambo, G. 2008; Barrett, C. B. 2008). With the correct support and 
appropriate institutional organisation, many of the challenges enumerated above may 
also present a great number of opportunities. Indeed, the World Development Report 
2008 states that ‘a key issue for development is enhancing the participation of 
smallholders and ensuring the poverty reducing impacts of agricultural growth’ (World 
Bank 2008: 12). Expanding agricultural markets can multiply development of other 
sectors such as non-farm employment, and generate development. Traders, moreover, 
are a market nexus with potential to efficiently deliver inputs and multiply interventions 
such as the provision of finance throughout the market system. Better market 
organisation not only involves more but also better linkages between different economic 
players, which in turn requires investment in various forms of human and social capital. 
1.1.1 Potential unrealised? 
Yet, smallholder collective action has a troubled past, in respect of both voluntary and 
statutory forms of association. By the 1990s the general consensus was that 
cooperatives in Africa were failing (Develtere, P., Pollet, I. and Wanyama, F. 2008), and 
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for multiple reasons. This report also looks at the historical context because ‘it is of 
prime importance to understand how cooperatives were introduced, what cooperative 
philosophy was construed and how this is related to cooperative behaviour, both social 
and economic, that existed in the region’ (p. 2). Dependency on government agricultural 
policies at the end of the colonial period and into the independence era restricted the 
development of strategic enterprise and despite liberalisation policies aimed at 
encouraging enterprise during the 1990s. The lack of documentation since that time has 
meant that little is known regarding the impact of these policies. Major considerations for 
developing better ways of organising markets for the poor are the following: 
1.1.2 Collective organisation: can it contribute to equitable and efficient markets?  
The resurgence of interest in farmer organisation, coming at a time when there are 
renewed goals for agriculture and the rural sector, is surprising, given the history of 
failure in many developing regions over the last two or three decades and the 
persistence of poverty even in the more successful developing countries. An historical 
analysis of the policy climate raises the question whether the resurgence of interest in 
farmer organisation is a full revolution of the development policy wheel. Answering this 
requires coverage of the agricultural policies pertaining to market development over a 
given period of years. Is it possible to identify political, economic, technical and social 
‘environmental’ changes that suggest that external conditions for successful farmer 
organisation are any more propitious than in the past? A second point of the review is to 
understand the previous experience of general disappointment in organisational 
performance, and from the learning experience to ascertain whether current types of 
intervention are different; in short, is the organisation model and its internal conditions 
any more propitious than in the past? A positive answer to either of these questions 
would suggest that the turn of the policy wheel is not merely recycling past ideas, but 
potentially progressing in some given direction. 
1.1.3 Can African cooperatives work? 
While many cooperatives may have struggled and disappeared, others have recast 
themselves in order to cope better with the changes in global markets. Cooperatives and 
rural associations are now resurgent business forms in Africa. It is - once again - 
accepted that farmer organisations offer a way to exploit the potential of collective action 
in order to access markets more effectively, to take advantage of organisational 
opportunities to overcome financial – cash and investment – constraints, and information 
asymmetries, and to exploit scale economies in production and marketing. The potential 
therefore for farmer associations to improve the livelihoods of the rural population and 
contribute to a decrease in poverty may well depend on a new generation of dynamic 
and alternative forms of commercial organisation. With rapidly changing global contexts, 
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what forms of smallholder farmer associations have found success and can these models 
be replicated? What support is necessary and feasible?  
1.1.4 What part does the institutional framework play? 
Market activity usually must operate within a broader framework of both formal and 
informal constraints that regulate economic activity. Institutions supporting a pro-poor 
commercial environment are likely to include both private commercial initiatives and also 
public policy interventions. Policies on competition, for example, can be locally targeted 
and help to restrain anti-competitive market structures and conduct, and serve as a 
framework for sectoral support from the public and donor sectors. Moreover, there are 
roles for civil society and advocacy organisations in building markets and necessary 
forms of institutional capital, such as an efficient regulatory environment, business ethics, 
social and environmental responsibility, competition policies, and consumer education. 
Similarly, multi-stakeholder interventions are necessary for the formation of social, 
economic and organisational capital such as efficient farmer associations.  
1.1.5 What part do international donors play? 
Donor participation is critical, but donor ideology has also influenced the choice of 
organisational forms and marketing interventions. Donor policies and projects are in turn 
influenced by pragmatic considerations such as how aid can be most easily dispensed, 
targets met, and supporters satisfied. This probably applies just as much at the 
beginning of the Twenty-first Century as during the Twentieth Century, and the danger 
of interventions representing prevailing conventional wisdom remains alive.  
1.1.6 How can agribusiness reduce poverty? 
The extent to which economic development and wellbeing can be generated by 
supporting the agricultural activities of the poorest is a moot point. Reduction of poverty 
among the poorest may be more likely to come through interventions targeted at the 
not-so-poor, with resulting multiplier effects through the labour market, for example. 
Businesses  may select against the extreme poor in such a way that agriculture, 
producer organisations and market integration are not a viable pathway out of poverty. 
These limits to direct intervention for poverty reduction are not well understood. 
1.1.7 What sort of markets matter to African smallholders? 
If the poorest agricultural smallholders are unlikely to be beneficiaries of commercial 
interventions because of resource constraints, market and public sector failures, and 
barriers to entry, are there alternative product markets in which they can engage to 
enhance their own food security and boost the local economy? 
 15 
1.2 Organisation of the report 
This report examines the structural and managerial characteristics of rural collective 
organisations in East and Southern Africa. Each section ends with key points or specific 
insights into the issues surrounding smallholder farmer associations and their potential 
role in market development and poverty reduction. 
 
In the section 2, the terminology of the subject matter is explained, and then key 
concepts are introduced that underlie the literature on smallholder farmer organisation. 
These are the New Institutional Economics concepts of transaction costs, applied 
principally to exchange between buyers and sellers in agrifood markets, but also 
concepts of business management within collective organisations. Attention is drawn to 
the need for entrepreneurism and deliberative processes of learning and development for 
smallholder organisations. Some readers may prefer to skip this more theoretical section, 
but on which the report later draws and without which it would be incomplete. 
 
In section 3 the report takes a long view of organisations by considering the historical, 
political, socio-economic and cultural factors in the development of collective 
organisation across a number of countries. The literature comes from a variety of 
sources: supply chain management, marketing, policy and governance. It encompasses 
academic research, policy documents and ‘grey’ literature from NGOs and other market 
players. The review seeks to advance an understanding of the different roles played by 
government and the private sector and analyse the structural characteristics and policy 
interventions that have contributed to collective organisation and enterprise. Through 
the use of examples and case studies, the report illustrates organisations in practice and 
considers the factors contributing to their successful participation in markets.  
 
A section is dedicated not to African organisations but to examples of organisational and 
institutional innovation from advanced economy countries. These cases suggest how new 
models of collective enterprise can be developed and might serve as examples for 
revising, or ‘re-envisioning’ cooperative organisational models in Africa. 
 
Section 4 reviews the external environment, taking this as international agribusiness and 
the global agricultural economy and policy. It comments on the need for a balanced 
perspective on the market opportunities and challenges, and notes that where 
smallholders have been successful in penetrating high value markets, often this is the 
result of context-specific interventions that may not be easily scaled up or replicated. It 
is made evident that a) opportunities for smallholder market entry, and b) the 
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contribution of farmer associations to poverty reduction, are both likely to be context-
specific, and should be locally-determined. 
 
Section 5 presents tools and typologies of farmer associations and presents examples in 
selected African countries. Importance is attached to the interrelationship between the 
organisation and the environment, including the supporting organisations and the 
institutional framework. This includes informal issues and trends towards inclusive 
approaches and stakeholder participation. These approaches are important inasmuch as 
they pay heed to significant social, cultural and political issues such as empowerment. 
These are generally of secondary importance to commercial organisations, 
notwithstanding the spread of the concepts of the three ‘Es’, or the ‘Triple Bottom Line’, 
of ‘economics, equity and environmental management’. A series of key lessons establish 
a link between theoretical considerations and empirical experience. 
 
Section 6 examines different types of inter-organisational coordination in African markets. 
Examples of smallholder-business engagement illustrate how specific businesses are 
willing to link with smallholders. The focus is on the private sector perspective on viable, 
or optimum, supply chain linkages and helps to frame the possibilities of external 
interventions and the significance of facilitating technologies such as IT. 
 
The final section 7 suggests a framework and analysis of how organisational types and 
linkages can be established with the external market environment through innovations in 
organisational structure, governance and enabling institutions. 
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2 Sectoral terms and context 
This section introduces the diverse terminology used throughout the literature in 
referring to associational forms of smallholder farmer organisation.  
 
Subsequently, key concepts are introduced that underlie the literature on smallholder 
farmer organisation. These are the New Institutional Economics concepts of transaction 
costs, applied principally to exchange between buyers and sellers in agrifood markets, 
but also, briefly, of management processes within collective organisations. Attention is 
also drawn to the need for entrepreneurism and deliberative processes of learning and 
development for smallholder organisations. Some readers may prefer to skip this more 
theoretical section, but on which the report later draws and without which the report 
would be incomplete. 
 
There follows an introduction to the history and evolution of collective organisation in the 
agrifood sector, summarising the economic and social principles underlying forms of 
collective organisation, and highlighting potential conflicts and tradeoffs between 
cooperation as a social movement and as a form of business enterprise. Space is given 
to the mechanisms that have caused the spread of collective organisation from advanced 
to developing countries, with a particular focus on Africa. Attention is drawn to how 
government sponsorship of cooperatives was often subverted by political objectives, and 
how voluntary collective organisation has been supplanted by statutory forms, and how 
these tendencies have been promoted by external donor organisations. Subsequent poor 
performance of state managed market organisation led to the enactment of policies of 
market liberalisation but did not elicit the expected private sector response. The supply 
chain integration that has occurred has been driven in high value markets by commercial 
firms while there has been a return – once again - to collective forms often initiated by 
external stakeholders to address the systemic weaknesses of market organisation among 
poorer smallholder farmers. Finally, examples of organisational and institutional 
innovation from advanced economy countries suggest how new models of collective 
enterprise can be developed and might serve as examples for innovative organisational 
models in African agriculture. 
2.1 Collaboration: terminology and rationale 
The term ‘smallholder farmers’ association’ is taken to refer to diverse types of groups 
who act collectively in order to benefit either as individuals or as a group. For some this 
may mean formal shared ownership and have democratic rights in decision-making 
processes at the grassroots level. For other groups it may mean an informal set of social 
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and business connections among farmers and between farmers and traders. The 
terminology used in the literature does not always differentiate between these diverse 
groups and uses terms such as cooperatives, farmer collectives, farmer associations, 
rural community enterprises, rural producer associations, community enterprises, micro 
and small enterprises, and farmer organisations (Donovan, J., Stoian, D. and Poole, N. D. 
2008: 15). These groups usually are bound together with a set of common economic 
goals, and often a concurrent objective of social cohesion and community development: 
economic and social inclusion. Collaboration can achieve inclusion through leveraging the 
characteristics of structure, strategy, performance and empowerment (Box 1): 
Box 1 Rationale for collaboration 
 
Economic inclusion 
Economic inclusion is closely linked to optimum scale, recognising that small organisations may 
fail because they do not achieve the minimum efficient scale, and also that large organisations 
can suffer from diseconomies, especially managerial diseconomies of scale. Economic inclusion 
may embrace elements such as:  
• Structure: through which an organisation achieves critical scale and increased access to 
markets. Advantages of scale include: 
o reduced costs for inputs, transformation and transaction functions 
o increased volumes, improved quality and timing of services and deliveries to 
market, associated networking advantages 
o potential for added value products 
o greater choice of routes to market. 
• Strategy: through which the organisation develops ‘market power’ in negotiation through 
scale and the creation and/or exploitation of sustainable competitive advantages 
• Performance: whereby the organisation achieves higher levels of efficiency and 
effectiveness – and perhaps equity - in production and marketing functions 
Social inclusion 
Empowerment is the principal mechanism for achieving social inclusion, which is mainly 
concerned with the creation of social and other forms of capital assets. Empowerment may be 
consistent with economic objectives, but can also create conflict and attenuate organisational 
performance. Empowerment and creation of social assets comes about through: 
• participation and self-empowerment – voice 
• individual and corporate capacity building 
• representation and democratic governance 
• female and ‘minority’ participation 
• advocacy. 
Source: adapted from Kachule, Poole and Dorward (2005). 
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2.2 Some theoretical considerations 
2.2.1 Market coordination: institutions, organisations, and transaction costs 
The respective roles of free markets and administered economic activity were one of the 
topics of greatest political and economic significance in the 20th Century. Into the new 
Century, neither free marketeers nor central planners have generated evidence sufficient 
to justify a polar conclusion about the respective coordinating roles of the ‘visible’ and 
‘invisible’ hands. North’s thesis (1990), now widely acknowledged, is that historic 
development has proceeded most effectively where economic activity has been 
supported by an institutional framework of incentives and both formal and informal 
constraints. He argues emphatically that it is the lack of institutional development that 
has characterised the low level of economic development in poor countries: business 
culture, societal norms and formal laws which fail to provide incentives for economic 
activities, such that economic organisations – firms, cooperatives and individual 
engagement in markets – are more ‘redistributive’ than ‘productive’. Transaction costs 
are often at a level that prohibits remunerative exchange: 'The costliness of information 
is the key to the costliness of transacting, which consists of the costs of measuring the 
valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the cost of protecting rights and 
policing and enforcing agreements. These measurement and enforcement costs are the 
sources of social, political, and economic institutions' (p. 27). Consequently, ‘the inability 
of societies to develop effective, low cost enforcement of contracts is the most important 
source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third 
World’ (p. 54). Fafchamps and Minten (1999) introduce the human element into 
considerations of market exchange in a succinct fashion: without supporting institutions, 
'the free market remains nothing but a flea market' (p. 31). In short, institutions must 
be created to support productive patterns of exchange between economic organisations, 
be they individual traders, collective organisations, or private firms. 
 
According to some analysts, planned coordination has a more important role in economic 
exchange than market coordination as a generator of economic growth: ‘History shows 
that the driving force of successful capitalist development is not the perfection of the 
market mechanism but the building of organizational capabilities’ (Lazonick, W. 1991: 8). 
Hall and Soskice’s treatise on institutions and economic development (Hall, P. A. and 
Soskice, D. 2001) distinguishes between ‘liberal market economies’ and ‘coordinated 
market economies’ as environments which offer different possibilities of institutional 
support, legal frameworks, industrial relations and strategic management. The result is 
distinctive forms of capitalism, varying according to the form and strength of the 
institutional framework. 
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2.2.2 Institutions 
The introduction into economics of the study of transactions is attributed to the US 
political economist John R. Commons. In the tradition of the American Institutionalists 
analysing collective action, Commons was searching for an economic theory of the part 
played by collective action in the control of individual action. The three constituents of 
collective action were, he believed, conflict, dependence and order – important 
characteristics of the intra-and inter-organisational relationships of farmer enterprise: for 
example, conflict over objectives of different stakeholders; dependence on external 
support; order in terms of governance and accountability. The unit of investigation that 
would encompass these three constituents was the transaction: ‘so I made the 
transaction the ultimate unit of economic investigation, a unit of transfer of legal control’ 
(Commons, J. R. 1934: 4). 
 
The fundamentals of Old Institutional Economics (OIE) concern the organisation and 
control of the economic system. The forces governing economic outcomes were regarded 
as mediated not first and foremost through the price mechanism, but through power 
relations, legal rights and the role of the polity – again, relevant to farmer associations. 
The operation of the price mechanism was not disputed but institutions were held to 
supersede prices in importance: ‘It is simply not true that scarce resources are allocated 
among alternative uses by the market..... The real determinant of whatever allocation 
occurs in any society is the organizational structure of that society - in short, its 
institutions’ (Ayres, C. E. 1957: 26).  
 
A tenet of OIE is that economic power is an important factor in the allocation of 
resources and in the distribution of gains from exchange. Power structures, therefore, 
mediate the terms of how smallholder organisations can access downstream markets. 
Also, OIE emphasises behavioural assumptions that are not simply self-maximising, and 
in many respects reflects more faithfully the behaviour of economic agents than common 
assumptions under prevailing neoclassical approaches, especially when collective action 
shapes the maximising calculus. 
2.2.3 Market analysis frameworks: SCP, SCM and NIE 
The organisation and performance of markets has been analysed for decades within the 
framework of ‘industrial organisation’ (IO), or structure-conduct-performance (SCP). 
Scherer and Ross define industrial organisation as ‘how productive activities are brought 
into harmony with the demand for goods and services through some organising 
mechanism such as the free market, and how variations and imperfections in the 
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organising mechanism affect the success achieved in satisfying an economy’s wants’ 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990: 1). 
 
The contemporary multiplication of ‘hybrid’ forms of interfirm organisation - 
arrangements intermediate between spot exchange and vertical integration - poses 
important challenges for economists within an IO framework as much as for firm 
managers. The importance of understanding the vertical coordination of economic 
exchange becomes increasingly evident as the choice of organisational relations in many 
markets, including the agrifood industry, shifts away from reliance on spot exchange 
within free markets. There has been a fundamental change in supply chains in the 
advanced economies, a shift from competitive vertical relations towards the cooperative 
organisation of the supply chain, or supply chain management (SCM). This process has 
been impelled not just by firm strategy but by the dynamic demand characteristics of 
food markets and the supply conditions characteristic of primary agricultural products. In 
particular, the consumers’ search for quality, safety and value-for-money, combined with 
the other pressures on food firms, is restructuring the supply chain. The costs that 
‘efficient consumer response’ and closer market coordination aim to save are analogous 
in part to Coase’s ‘marketing costs’ (1937) which have been popularised since as 
transaction costs (Williamson, O. E. 1975; Williamson, O. E. 1985).  
 
New (1997) has drawn attention to the context of SCM in industrial societies. He cited 
three issues of ethical significance: the exploitation of poor producers in developing 
countries; power imbalances in the corporate economy; and 'environment' in a general 
sense. Many others could be added. According to New, consumption involves issues of 
both efficiency and justice: 'There is a direct connection between the design and 
operation of the supply chain and the social and economic experience of those with the 
least power.... Even in the developed world, the issue of relative power affects the 
interpretation and meaning of supply chain innovations' (p. 19). 
 
The study of contractual relationships has become central to public policies and firm 
strategies for market development. Mighell and Jones (1963) published the seminal work 
on the use of contracts as mechanisms of vertical coordination in the food system. By 
vertical coordination, they meant ‘all the ways in which the vertical stages of production 
are controlled and directed, within firms (by the administration) and between firms (by 
the price/market mechanism)’ (p. 10). The means of vertical coordination include open 
market prices, government controls, use of different forms of contracts, and integration. 
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In discussing the different forms of agricultural contracts, they proposed a typology, the 
significant differences within which lie in the extent to which specified processes or 
stages in production are transferred between the parties: 
• market-specification contracts occur where the producer transfers part of the risk 
and management function to another for at least one production period; 
• production-management contracts call for a more direct participation by the 
contractor in production management; 
• in resource-providing contracts, the contractor also provides inputs, the producer is 
paid for his management, and the contractor assumes much more of the production 
risk. 
 
Between these types of contract the boundaries are imprecise (Mighell and Jones, 1963: 
13-14). However, this simple approach to mechanisms of coordination abstracts entirely 
from the institutions of power and wider – network-type economic relationships. 
2.2.4 Inter-organisational transactions 
At a conceptual level, writers have voiced concerns about the lack of application of 
conventional analysis to problems of interfirm contractual arrangements in real markets. 
Williamson built on Coase’s 1937 theory of the firm to analyse his preoccupation with the 
coexistence of markets and hierarchies for economic coordination (Williamson, O. E. 
1975; Williamson, O. E. 1985). His thesis was that variation in and evolution of 
organisational forms depends on the technology of transacting and the incentive to 
minimise transaction costs. What differentiated his analyses from the typical SCP 
approach, according to Williamson, was the treatment of the internal decision making 
process of the firm and how exchange activities are assigned to different organisational 
forms or ‘governance structures’: they are either integrated within the firm, or 
undertaken through spot markets, or by some form of intermediate contractual (‘hybrid’) 
relationship. What has come to be known as the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
branch of New Institutional Economics (NIE) is directly concerned with the issues of 
market organisation, and the concepts are particularly helpful in understanding the 
challenges of farmer collective organisation.  
 
The work of Coase, Williamson and others has resulted in Transaction Cost Economics 
becoming one of the most influential branches of the New Institutional Economics school. 
Transaction costs are now widely held to be an important explanation of the vertical 
arrangements within markets and industries generally. 
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2.2.5 Transaction costs 
Coase argued that the main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm is that there is 
a cost of using the price mechanism. The costs of ‘organising’ production through the 
price mechanism are those of price discovery and negotiating contracts. Thus, firms exist 
for efficiency reasons. When the cost to an economic agent of procuring goods or 
services using the price mechanism (the market) exceeds the cost of self-supply 
(integration), then the agent will internalise the supply, and a firm will come into being.  
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) is concerned with transaction costs and the 
organisation and development of economic activity. ‘At the heart of institutional 
economics is the making, monitoring and enforcing of contracts’ (Hubbard, M. 1997: 
240). Although Williamson traced its origins to the 1930s, NIE derives its concern with 
transactions costs, and little else, from OIE. 
 
In Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), it is the transaction rather than the commodity 
that is the unit of analysis. A transaction is a process linking various functions, involving 
the exchange of information, goods, services, money and property rights. Transaction 
costs are the costs of these exchanges and arise whenever there is any form of 
economic organisation, be it within a vertically integrated firm, in a market or in a 
command economy (in which transactions are largely absent). Transaction costs are of 
both an ex ante and ex post kind: 
1. ex ante costs: 
• searching for potential exchange agents (buyers or sellers); 
• screening potential agents for characteristics such as honesty, creditworthiness; 
• bargaining over terms of exchange and price determination; 
2. ex post costs: 
• transferring property rights; 
• monitoring compliance with contractual terms; 
• enforcing sanctions in the event of non-compliance. 
 
The true costs of exchange therefore comprise a) the orthodox neoclassical 
transformation costs associated with the production and distribution of goods and 
services, and b) the transaction costs of searching, measuring, mediating and monitoring 
during the exchange process incurred in order to bring together buyers and sellers and 
complete the exchange. The total costs of economic activity are then made up as follows: 
 
costs total = costs transformation + costs transaction 
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The source of transaction costs is the complexity and uncertainty of the real economic 
environment: ‘The ease or difficulty of contracting, and the types of contract made, are 
determined by the level and nature of transaction costs, underlying which is the extent 
of imperfect information involved in making a transaction’ (Hubbard, M. 1997: 240). 
 
The basic concepts underlying TCE are certain assumptions about behaviour, and certain 
dimensions of transactions. 
Behavioural assumptions 
Regarding behaviour, man is perceived as being motivated by the conventional 
maximising calculus constrained by bounded rationality and influenced by opportunism. 
Opportunism 
This is a negative self-maximising attribute, a predisposition to lie, cheat, or steal. 
Bounded rationality 
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively 
rational behaviour in the real world.  
Transaction dimensions 
According to TCE, there are three important dimensions of transactions: asset specificity, 
frequency of transactions, and uncertainty due to lack of information and informational 
asymmetry, leading to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Asset specificity 
Asset specificity refers to a situation where durable investments are associated with a 
particular transaction, and where the redeployment of such investments is not possible, 
or at best the recovery of which would give rise to considerable sunk costs. Three types 
of asset specificity are found: 
• site specificity: firms or plants are located in close proximity in order to economise on 
labour skills, transportation costs, inventories; 
• physical specificity: plant, machinery and technology that are specific to a transaction; 
• human specificity: specific labour skills, social and managerial relationships, and 
process economies derived from cost reductions through learning by doing and from 
information sharing. 
Frequency of transactions 
In a world of impersonal exchange, buyers and sellers are dealing with multiple 
individuals, and can acquire very little information about them. Where the exchange is 
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not repeated, opportunism creates the need for third-party enforcement of contractual 
terms. On the contrary, in an ideal world when transactions are frequently repeated, the 
buyers and sellers are known or easily identified. Repeated transactions between the 
same players therefore lead to self-enforcing cooperative solutions. Also relevant to 
frequency is the size of the transaction: the smaller the transaction, the less the 
incentive to opportunism.  
Informational asymmetry and agency problems 
Imperfect information, therefore, underlies transaction costs, and differentiates NIE from 
neoclassical market analyses. Uncertainty arises in exchange for a number of reasons 
(Jaffee, S. 1995): 
• information is asymmetric, that is, usually held unequally between contracting 
parties: buyers of agrifood products usually know more about market prices and 
demand conditions, and sellers know more about the characteristics such as quality 
of the raw products; 
• in most explicit contracts, and in all implicit contracts, property rights are unlikely to 
be completely specified, and are therefore subject to non-excludability and non-
transferability; 
• there are agency problems which arise from potential conflicts of interests between 
transactors. The tendency to engage in either cooperative or competitive behaviour 
creates uncertainty and requires monitoring and enforcement. 
 
The relationship between two firms is of the ‘principal-agent’ type if the information and 
actions of the secondary (agent) firm are hidden from the primary (principal) firm. 
Where the interests of the agent do not coincide with those of the principal the primary 
firm must provide an incentive to align the otherwise conflicting interests. Two important 
results of the principal-agent problem are adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
Through adverse selection, high quality goods are displaced by those of lower quality, 
and consequently the market is characterised by only poorer quality products and lower 
prices (Akerlof, G. A. 1970). This is true especially if seller reputation is unimportant and 
sellers of higher quality goods are unable to signal high quality. Moral hazard arises 
when imperfect monitoring due to lack of information facilitates opportunistic, ex post, 
usually hidden default with respect to contractual agreements. Moral hazard, like other 
forms of opportunistic behaviour, is attenuated under conditions of long-term 
relationships (Holmström, B. 1979). 
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2.2.6 The significance of transaction costs in agrifood markets 
TCE regards the choice of vertical coordination mechanism on the spectrum from spot 
markets to vertical integration as a decision variable. In short, the multiplicity of 
contractual arrangements arises because transactions differ and efficiency is realised 
only if coordination mechanisms are tailored to each transaction. TCE adopts a 
comparative approach to the microanalysis of coordination mechanisms, what Williamson 
calls ‘the institutions of governance’.  
 
It is usually assumed that the objective of the economic agent is to minimise the sum of 
transaction and production costs; that is to say, transactions are assigned to different 
coordinating mechanisms to minimise total costs. In short, as Wallis and North argue, 
‘people maximize net benefits’ (Wallis, J. J. and North, D. C. 1986: 97). Transaction 
costs are major determinants of forms of market organisation and how sellers and 
buyers in agrifood markets choose to contract. The significance of the transaction costs 
of searching, etc, is that if total costs exceed the net benefits of exchange, buyers and 
sellers are unable to agree terms and markets probably will fail. New Institutional 
Economics, therefore, provides a framework, albeit partial, for understanding optimal 
organisational arrangements for agrifood enterprises. 
2.2.7 The problems of collective business management 
When collective action is considered, and enterprise becomes conflated with social action, 
the maximising objectives becomes much less clear, be they individual or collective, 
owner versus management, social or economic. The question not addressed by Wallis 
and North, is ‘which people?’ It is not only the transaction costs of the market that come 
into play, but also the transaction costs within an organisation, especially of a collective 
organisation: the costs of managing implicit contracts between a range of diverse 
stakeholders and reconciling competing objectives. 
Entrepreneurism 
It is because of this complexity that other insights from the field of business 
management also matter. To reduce a wide field of study to brief concepts, it is the way 
that an organisation identifies market opportunities, and applies resources, expertise and 
leadership that determine its performance. Institutional innovation: 
‘.. means novelty, new things being done, or old things being done in new ways. 
This presupposes opportunities, vision, risk-taking and resources. These values 
must be shared by organisations and their staff, and both must be 
entrepreneurial. Entrepreneurial organisations have particular characteristics in 
terms of culture and personnel. There must be a fit between culture, structure, 
resources and the tasks... Managers must be ‘intrapreneurs’ (Wickham, P. A. 
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2006): entrepreneurial managers who work within the confines of a mature 
organisation, but with vision, embracing novelty and risk-taking’ (Poole, N. D. 
and Penrose Buckley, C. 2006: 55-6).  
 
The roles of management in a commercial agrifood firm are to: 
• Identify market opportunities for agricultural products, raw or transformed 
• Attract and manage the human and financial resources necessary to access these 
markets 
• Lead and direct the organisation as a whole, and manage wider stakeholder 
relationships 
 
To be succinct, contemporary commercial organisations need to be entrepreneurial. This 
is a characteristic not commonly associated with the traditional cooperative. 
Entrepreneurism needs to be inbuilt, and conflicts with collective governance structures: 
vision and risk-taking are unlikely to be present within bureaucratic structures, which 
characterise many forms of collective enterprise. Governance structures often curtail 
management freedom. Equally, the necessary internal skills and resources are often not 
present in rural grassroots organisations. This suggests a long and steep learning curve 
for many collective forms of smallholder farmers. 
Building organisations 
There is no one model or set of key success factors for successful organisational 
development, but success depends on ‘organisational fit’ (Korten, D. C. 1980). ‘Fit’ is a 
concept widely recognised in the management literature, which has been used in 
analysis of the agrifood sector1. ‘Organisational fit’ in rural development, Korten argued, 
is the extent to which program design, beneficiary needs and the capacities of the 
assisting organisation are productively aligned. Essentially, key variables are the task, 
the context, and the organisation.  ‘Fit’ can be conceived as a function of: 
• the organisation membership 
o need and effective demand for services 
o participation in organisation management 
• the organisation itself 
                                          
 
 
1 See, for example, García Martínez, M. and Poole, N.D. (2004). Analysing linkages between 
strategy, performance, management structure and culture in the Spanish fresh produce industry. 
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 7(4): 16-39.  
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o governance structures, de jure and de facto 
o management skills and capacity  
• the services provided by the organisation 
o complexity of the mix of services necessary to meet objectives 
o service delivery systems 
 
The concept of ‘fit’ can be applied not only at the level of the membership and the 
management of the organisation, but also between a grassroots form of organisation or 
association, higher ‘tiers’ of organisation that are common in cooperatives, and the 
supporting organisations that are commonly found in the agrifood sector of developing 
countries. These are the commercial partners, NGOs and other supporting organisations, 
donors, and the public sector organisations – all stakeholders within the complex of the 
market system. 
 
Korten (1980) also addressed organisational development and suggested three stages 
that may underlie successful capacity building. Organisational performance and 
development are more or less successful, according to the way that the tasks, and the 
organisation itself, develop within a particular context. This he called the ‘learning 
process’ approach. He envisaged three stages in the learning process, during which 
organisations first learn to be effective (a time of investment in knowledge and capacity 
building); then efficient (reducing the input requirements in relation to outputs - or 
services – delivered); and lastly to expand (growth to maturity). Regarding expansion, 
optimal organisation size for a particular context – of people, products, services, and 
environment – may vary, and the advantages and disadvantages of scale must be 
specifically considered. Efficient scale may apply to a range of organisation sizes, and 
may also change with the wider environment, technology and political processes. Once 
again, there is no single model or blueprint for optimal size and development pathways. 
2.2.8 Organisational structure, environment and culture 
There is an enormous literature on organisational management and cooperation from 
which to derive a framework for understanding the characteristics of collective farmer 
groups. From the management literature, such as Handy, and many reviews and 
summaries such as Chirwa et al (2005), Berdegué, Biénabe and Peppelenbos (2008), 
and Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin and Dohrn (2009), the following features of group 
management are known to be important for farmer associations: 
Group characteristics 
• Origin – self- or externally initiated 
• Coherence with (pre-) existing organisations and culture 
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• Size – number of members 
• Composition – homo-/heterogeneity in respect of social and economic characteristics 
• Internal governance – representation, transparency and accountability 
• Leadership style – participation or hierarchy and elitism 
• Management skills – training and professionalism 
• Capital investment – fixed physical and other assets, including intangibles 
• Motivation and objectives – focus, complexity and boundaries 
• Formalisation – constitution, registration, federation/integrative structures 
 
On these, there is no absolute guidance about what does and what does not work, but 
under varying circumstances, different blends of characteristics can enhance or impair 
group performance.  
External environment 
From the NIE perspective, organisations are shaped, by, and through advocacy also 
shape, the external environment, that may be more or less favourable. These ideas are 
developed in subsequent sections on actual cases of farmers associations but it is 
sufficient here to highlight the importance of a range of institutional and organisational 
factors in the environment external to the actual farmer association: 
• Supporting relationships and organisations – public/private/NGO sector facilitation 
• Political environment – dis- or enabling legal and cultural framework 
• Communication and logistics infrastructure 
 
There is no doubt about the importance of a propitious facilitating environment and good 
physical and other infrastructure as a foundation for good performance. 
What product? 
Finally, for farmer organisations there is another set of factors affecting an organisation’s 
operations, which are the technoeconomic characteristics of products and/or services: 
• Complexity of service provision – range of inputs/products or services 
• Bulk and value/value-added of inputs/products or services 
• Quality characteristics, standards and differentiation 
• Processing and manufacturing opportunities 
• Market type and distance – local/domestic, national/urban and export 
 
The literature provides pointers to technoeconomic characteristics that are conducive to 
good performance of agricultural organisations, such as high value products and markets 
rather than bulk commodities which can cover the transaction costs of organisation, but 
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again there is no absolute guidance about what does and what does not work (Hellin, J., 
Lundy, M. and Meijer, M. 2009). 
2.3 Key insights 
The theory introduced here suggests many hypotheses about farmer organisations 
concerning which the review sections that follow will tend to endorse. Significant points 
among these which raise transaction costs and constrain management performance are: 
• Behavioural assumptions: within collective forms of social and economic organisation 
there will be complex and often conflicting incentive structures that will tend to 
impair organisational efficiency and effectiveness 
• Limited and asymmetric information: within organisations and between different 
market players available, high levels of uncertainty are characteristic about 
stakeholder behaviour, institutions such as laws and the policy environment; and 
specific agribusiness features such as product market requirements, quality 
assurance, traceability and certification 
• Management skills: generally these are inadequate to manage complex structures; 
agency problems are common, and the lack of entrepreneurship limits strategic 
vision 
• Asset specificity: investment is a requirement: for capacity building, resources are 
often available; for necessary physical capital and public goods, there are significant 
internal and external financial constraints 
• Repeat dealing: clientisation is important for building a market presence, interfirm 
relationships, skills and reputation; these learning processes take time, often more 
time, and an ability to absorb mistakes and losses, than is widely understood and 
accepted 
• Donor fads and fancies: imposition from external agencies of dominant, yet changing 
development paradigms ignores the need for ‘fit’ and patience in organisational 
learning. 
2.4 Synthesising a framework 
Among the possible approaches to consider collective forms of linking smallholder 
farmers in Africa to new market opportunities, transaction cost concepts are widely used 
to explain the phenomena – or obstacles – to successful exchange. Transaction cost 
economics also provides insights into the successful management of internal 
complexities of collective organisations. In addition, the field of business management, 
or more precisely, entrepreneurism, adds a sharp challenge to the analysis of 
organisations that attempt to engage in increasingly sophisticated and competitive 
markets. The management issues underlying the growth and development of successful 
collective enterprises will also inform the following discussion of linking smallholder 
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farmers to markets, and of the institutional innovation that may be necessary to drive 
existing forms of association towards more effective market linkages that contribute to 
the overall agenda of reducing rural poverty. 
 
Drawing on the renewed interest in New Institutional Economics, two key concepts in the 
reappraisal of agricultural marketing intervention approaches policies are ‘institutions’ 
and ‘organisations’. A simple typology of initiatives to address market failures and 
imperfections can be envisaged and represented in a matrix framework: 
2.4.1 Institutional interventions 
As noted, institutions are the rules of the game, humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction and structure incentives in human exchange - they reduce uncertainty 
by establishing a stable structure to human interaction (North, D. C. 1990). Institutional 
change shapes the way societies evolve through time, define and create, expand and 
limit the set of choices of individuals. Such institutions can be formal or informal, created 
or evolving, written and unwritten. They include mechanisms for monitoring commercial 
arrangements, enforcing contracts and ascertaining and punishing violations. 
 
Institutional innovations could be the formalisation of contracts between sellers and 
buyers of agricultural produce in order to reduce the uncertainty caused by low levels of 
trust and limited possibilities of redress, which is the situation which obtains in much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Poole, N. D., Seini, A. W. and Heh, V. 2003). Also in Ghana, 
improved use of intellectual property rights legislation should help develop innovative 
and productive activities across an range of markets in which small firms engage (Sey, 
A., Lowe, B. and Poole, N. D. 2010 forthcoming). Another type of intervention suggested 
is the need for an independent audit body for monitoring and improving the performance 
of farmer organisations in Malawi (Kachule, R., Poole, N. D. and Dorward, A. 2005). An 
innovation such as a professional and independent regional or national ombudsman for 
auditing grassroots associations could help both performance and accountability. 
2.4.2 Organisational interventions 
Like institutions, organisations provide a structure to human interaction - but they are 
the players of the game rather than the rules (North, D. C. 1990). They are political, 
economic, social, educational bodies: public and private sector and civil society 
organisations, and groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve 
joint objectives. They are influenced by the institutional framework and in turn, influence 
institutions, for example, through the advocacy common among collective organisations, 
and lobbying of private sector and other interest groups. In subsequent sections, cases 
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of cooperative development are presented that demonstrate organisational innovation to 
improve governance, enhance market orientation and facilitate capital raising. 
 
The interplay of organisations (players) and institutions (rules) can be depicted as giving 
rise to a simple typology of market exchange (Figure 1a). Interventions can be primarily 
of the organisational type, or can be attempts to change the institutional framework 
within which farmers and organisations operate. Most historical and current policies for 
the development of markets and to increase smallholder access will embrace elements of 
both approaches. The respective policy interventions (and commercial initiatives) 
suggest how different types of market exchange might result from different (external) 
interventions or (private) initiatives.  
Figure 1a Interventions, initiatives and market types 
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The model suggests clues as to the sort of approaches to developing different markets 
and sectors in developing countries. Cooperation can take various forms: either 
collaboration institutionalised within voluntary organisations, or through the framework 
of formal institutions and regulations, or through informal institutions (eg inter-personal 
and inter-firm relationships).  
 
Such cooperation between sellers and buyers is a fundamental means to reduce 
transaction costs, and opens up possibilities of value chain management – eg improved 
production and marketing specifications, and sharing of skills, information and 
investment - that can also lead to better intra-firm management. Such a dynamic can be 
depicted by adapting the model to show how increasing cooperation and information 
sharing shifts the interfirm relationship towards more effective market coordination and 
higher level participation in the chain of value from supplier to consumer (Figure 1b). 
Figure 1b Trajectories of increasing cooperation and coordination 
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3 A long view of agricultural cooperation 
3.1 History and evolution of collective organisations  
From the earliest times there has been a distinction between the cooperative 'movement' 
which was rooted in historical socio-political conditions, and the cooperative as a 
business enterprise. The economic and social dilemma, and an anticompetitive 
dimension posed by the dual nature of collective organisation and enterprise, were 
captured by an early critic who commented that ‘a farmer-owned, farmer-controlled 
cooperative [is] a legal, practical means by which a group of self-selected, selfish 
capitalists seek to improve their individual economic positions in a competitive society' 
(Babcock, H. E. 1935: 153). 
 
The current state of farmer associations in Eastern and Southern Africa has much to do 
with the Nineteenth Century of models of collective economic organisation, of the 
prevailing policies of donor organisations, and the political economy of specific countries 
and regions. The next section will trace the historical and political background. 
3.1.1 Origins and principles of collective enterprise 
It was before the 13th Century, in France and Switzerland, that the milk producers of 
Gruyère and Emmenthal formed farmer cooperatives with specific economic objectives: 
to pool the milk from several herds and thereby accumulate sufficient liquid milk to make 
cheese. The benefits from large scale enterprise were shared among the members of the 
group in proportion to their use of its services. 
 
Most modern cooperatives trace their heritage to the Industrial Revolution. In the UK the 
first attempts to set up cooperatives date from the late eighteenth century. They were 
workers' consumer cooperatives and some went so far as to have an organisational 
structure: members’ meetings, an elected management committee, and a distribution of 
profit among the members. Their success was short-lived, however, because of 
structural problems that are persistent – or permanent - weaknesses: they lacked capital 
and ran up debts; they lacked management expertise; and they were opposed by other 
economic and class interests. 
 
The 'Rochdale Equitable Pioneers' was the first true cooperative formed in 1844 in the 
northern UK town of Rochdale. A group of poor cotton weavers pooled resources and set 
up a shop selling staple foods. Soon the cooperative membership was opened to all 
customers who became shareholders with democratic decision-making rights. The 
principles set out by the Rochdale Society in 1844 have influenced the way in which 
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cooperatives have been managed throughout the world ever since. Frederick Raiffeisen 
set up the first agricultural cooperatives in conformity with the ‘Rochdale Principles’ in 
Germany in 1849. He emphasised the role of the savings and loan function of the 
cooperative to achieve financial independence from usurious moneylenders and added a 
principle of collective financial responsibility. The first laws on cooperatives were 
promulgated in the UK in 1852 followed by Prussia in 1867, in order to formalise existing 
practice that followed the Rochdale and Raiffeisen ‘Principles’. The Rochdale Principles, 
adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) in 1937, were updated in 1995, 
and broadly underlie most forms of association of smallholder farmers (Box 2).  
Box 2 Cooperative principles and identity 
 
•  Voluntary and Open Membership: Co-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all 
persons able to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, 
without gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination. 
•  Democratic Member Control: Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their 
members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and 
women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary 
co-operatives, members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives 
at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner. 
•  Member Economic Participation: Members contribute equitably to, and democratically 
control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part of that capital is usually the common 
property of the co-operative. Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on 
capital subscribed as a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or all of 
the following purposes: developing their co-operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part 
of which at least would be indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions 
with the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved by the membership. 
•  Autonomy and Independence: Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations 
controlled by their members. If they enter to agreements with other organisations, including 
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that ensure 
democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative autonomy. 
• Education, Training and Information: Co-operatives provide education and training for their 
members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute 
effectively to the development of their co-operatives. They inform the general public - 
particularly young people and opinion leaders - about the nature and benefits of co-
operation. 
• Co-operation among Co-operatives: Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and 
strengthen the co-operative movement by working together through local, national, regional 
and international structures. 
• Concern for Community: Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their 
communities through policies approved by their members. 
Source: http://www.ica.coop/coop/principles.html. Accessed 15 December 2009 
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According to the ICA a cooperative is an association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-
owned and democratically-controlled enterprise. The core values of cooperatives are 
self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity.  
3.1.2 The spread of collective organisation and enterprise 
As the cooperative ideal spread in Europe the initiative was generally of well-meaning 
private citizens. The sector developed in Africa mostly as the result of intervention by 
colonial administrations. Kenya’s first cooperative was founded in 1908 (Box 3). The first 
cooperative in Uganda was a growers’ association in 1913. Although quickly abandoned, 
it paved the way for the Buganda Growers’ Association founded in 1923 and later the 
Uganda Growers’ Cooperative Union in 1933 (Young, C., Sherman, N. P. and Rose, T. H. 
1981: 58). In the Belgian Congo, cooperatives emerged in the 1920s. In South Africa 
also in the 1920s, cooperatives were introduced to promote the interests white farmers, 
and exercise control of prices through agricultural marketing boards (Develtere, P., Pollet, 
I. and Wanyama, F. 2008: 11). Box 3 outlines the varied origins and forms of models of 
collective enterprise and associated organisational features in Africa.  
Box 3 Models of collective enterprise in Africa 
 
 
• The unified cooperative model: rooted in the British colonial administration and aimed at 
developing a single cooperative movement. The structure comprises levels with primary 
cooperatives at the base, followed by secondary regional societies, federations and unions 
and an apex organisation at the highest level.  
• The social economy tradition: defined by the shared social and economic objectives of 
members. Developed generally in Francophone and Hispanic countries, this cooperative 
model can take the form of mutual societies, associations, foundations and trusts. 
• The social movement tradition: based primarily on collective action and is embedded in the 
Belgian tradition of cooperative organisation. The cooperative is viewed by members as a 
social movement that may encompass women’s groups, farmer organisations, trade unions 
etc. The model has been an influence in the development of cooperatives in Central Africa.  
• The producers’ tradition: viewed primarily as a functional organisation enabling farmers to 
participate more effectively in markets, thereby improving their capacity to achieve social 
objectives. This model stems from a Portuguese tradition of cooperative organisation.  
• The indigenous tradition: unlike the preceding four is rooted in endogenous organisation. 
These forms of organisation are to be found in countries with a limited colonial history, 
such as Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and Sierra Leone. Indigenous models are based within 
local frameworks of understanding and respond to local socio-economic challenges. 
Source: adapted from Develtere et al (2008) 
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Among the early cooperatives that also emerged from the colonial authorities were those 
aimed at lifting the peasant farmer out of subsistence, and modernizing the agricultural 
sector. Young et al (1981) identified the introduction of cash crops in British-ruled Africa 
such as sugar, cocoa, cotton and coffee as a principal stimulus for the creation of 
cooperatives in order to counteract the disadvantages of trade felt by the peasant 
farmers. In the cases where cooperatives were a private initiative, for example in East 
Africa, often the impetus came from emerging (African) private traders who wished to 
challenge the supremacy of the existing (Asian) traders, in order to promote their own 
advantage rather than that of community association.  
Box 4 History of co-operatives in Kenya 
 
 
The kind of cooperative inherited by the newly independent developing country 
governments in the 1950s and 1960s was generally an organisation instituted to 
promote the interests of its members as perceived by outside agencies. Cooperation was 
seen by the new governments as an institutional vehicle to replace the foreign trading 
interests, some of whom withdrew at independence, others of whom wielded too much 
economic power. The existing cooperative enterprises also could be used to meet the 
political, social and economic problems and challenges, particularly in relation to rural 
development. 
3.2 The political economy of agricultural collective organisation 
3.2.1 Political subversion of collective organisation and enterprise 
Cooperatives were also been seen as a form of social organisation aimed at unifying 
interests, which often were political. In Tanzania, grassroots cooperatives were 
encouraged prior to independence and after, resulting in them gaining considerable 
political strength, so much so, that the government abolished cooperatives in 1976, 
‘The first Kenya’s Co-operative Society [sic], Lumbwa Co-operative Society, was formed in 1908 
by the European Farmers with the main objective of purchasing fertilizer, chemicals, seeds and 
other farm input and then market their produce to take advantage of economies of scale. In 
1930, Kenya Farmers Association was registered as a Co-operative Society to take over the role 
of supply of farm input played by Lumbwa Co-operative Society. The African smallholder farmers 
fought for formation of their own Cooperatives and later in 1950’s they were allowed to promote 
and register Co-operatives for cash crops like coffee and pyrethrum. Consequently at 
independence in 1963, there were 1,030 Co-operative Societies with 655 being active with a 
total membership of 355,000…’ 
Source: http://www.sccportal.org/Default.aspx?ID=827&M=News&NewsID=1934&PID=69. 
Accessed 18 December 2009 
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replacing them with parastatal crop authorities. The resulting drop in agricultural 
production over the next 5 years resulted in their re-establishment in 1982 (Lele, U. and 
Christiansen, R. E. 1989: 18).  
 
Socialist states elsewhere adopted cooperatives as a form of social organisation and 
political control, as well as economic organisation. For example, after independence in 
Mozambique, the Third Congress of FRELIMO in 1977 released a report noting that ‘The 
co-operative movement, under the leadership of the Party, constitutes a huge 
mobilisation of the great masses of peasants for the organised, conscious and planned 
participation in the socialist development of the whole country’ (Harris, L. 1980). Such 
ideals have been reformed as a consequence of the liberalising tendencies during the 
latter part of the Twentieth Century (Lamont, J. T. J. 1993; Spooner, N. 1994 ). 
3.2.2 Models of ‘statutory’ association 
It had been hoped that the early marketing cooperatives might increase the bargaining 
power of producers. The experience proved to be unsatisfactory. ‘Free-riding’ was one 
reason: when fruit producers' cooperatives in Canada and Australia tried to store part of 
the crop in order to market it later in the year they found that non-members profited 
most from any rise in price - temporal arbitrage; so-called free-riders were able to sell 
their produce without bearing any of the cost of storage. Non-members also benefited 
from the efforts of cooperatives in opening up distant markets without bearing the costs 
of membership. It was the failure of cooperatives to secure the economic position of 
producers in a time of severe agricultural depression which led to the introduction of 
statutory - legal - marketing powers: some sort of government intervention was 
necessary to secure the cooperation of non-members and thereby market the whole crop. 
Thus compulsion replaced the voluntary cooperation of the Rochdale Principles as a new 
policy instrument to achieve similar objectives.  
 
State marketing boards were set up in many countries under British colonial influence, 
and were also represented in the Francophone world by Caisses de Stabilisation. 
Marketing organisation became of increasing importance during World War II. West 
African oil palm produce and groundnut marketing were brought under government 
control in 1942. The Cocoa Control Board was renamed the West African Produce Control 
Board, (WAPCB), with jurisdiction over Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. 
According to Abbott and Creupelandt (Abbott, J. and Creupelandt, H. 1966), the 
objectives were: 
• obtaining funds for sales promotion, research and extension; 
• raising the bargaining power of agricultural producers on domestic/export markets; 
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• improving marketing organisation and methods by regulating quality and packing 
standards, market procedures, sales practices, by raising the scale of operation and 
setting up needed marketing and processing facilities, and facilitating a more precise 
adjustment of the quantities and types of produce sold on particular markets; 
• equalising returns from sales to different price markets or outlets; 
• sheltering producers and consumers against the impact of sharply fluctuating internal 
and external prices. 
3.2.3 Donor support for state intervention 
The expansion of state marketing in the post-colonial and independence period could not 
have been undertaken without the provision of aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, 
whose investment policies constituted an endorsement of such a strategy. Marketing 
boards were a convenient counterpart agency for aid donors whose programmes of food 
aid, infrastructural investment and rural development projects were increasing in 
importance. A common typology for classifying the services and objectives of such 
marketing boards was that proposed by Abbott and Creupelandt and reflects an era of 
strong market intervention (1966): 
• advisory and promotional activities directed towards producers 
• regulation and control of production and of marketing activities 
• non-trading price stabilisation 
• price stabilisation through trading 
• monopoly export marketing 
• monopoly domestic marketing 
 
In six African countries, between 1970 and 1987 the value of external assistance 
constituted between 35% and 70% of government expenditures (Lele, U. and 
Christiansen, R. E. 1989). In Tanzania by the end of the 1970s nearly 400 parastatals 
handled production, processing, transport and marketing of goods and services, and the 
prices of nearly 1000 commodities were controlled. A 1988 World Bank report 
documented that over the period 1974-1985, Sub-Saharan Africa received more World 
Bank support than Asia and Latin America, involving some 48 food crop projects, 45 
export crop projects and 17 livestock projects that had some marketing components, 
with significant intervention through collective marketing organisations. The donor 
perspective was influenced by the following factors within the policy environment: 
• parastatal projects were easy to appraise 
• for monopoly organisations there was no alternative 
• the recipient government was supportive 
• ease of project management – marketing organisations were discrete entities 
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• policy support for taxation of agriculture to mobilise public-sector revenues 
 
The Francophone Sahelian also states all intervened on a massive scale with similar 
objectives. In general, the development of market organisations was dependent upon, or 
reflected, the economic and political history not just of the individual country, but also of 
the broader context: where export crops were involved, a country's trading partners was 
a factor which contributed towards the nature of domestic 'institutional' development. 
Access to markets was facilitated by the close industrial relationships with major private 
sector buyers, foreshadowing the supply chain linkages with international manufacturers 
and distributors that drive contemporary agrifood markets. 
 
On the whole the picture given in the literature about the performance of state-managed 
marketing is a gloomy one. Marketing boards were weak organisations which achieved 
little success, with multiple, unrealistic and conflicting objectives. And in general, food 
crop or domestic marketing boards faced more problems and were less likely to succeed 
in their objectives than those concerned with the export of high value agricultural 
products (Arhin, K., Hesp, P. and van der Laan, L. 1985). Poor, local producers were 
affected most by the systemic failure. This differentiation – or inequity –between the 
beneficiaries of statutory marketing and those excluded from market opportunities was a 
structural characteristic that has been replicated latterly in supply chains to non-
traditional, high value domestic and export markets (Reardon, T., Timmer, C. P., Barrett, 
C. B. and Berdegué, J. 2003; García Martínez, M. and Poole, N. D. 2004). 
 
What is generally absent in developing economies is the coordinating activity of industry 
bodies, and role which marketing boards could still play. An example from Spain 
demonstrates how ‘interprofessional’ organisations unite sector stakeholders (Box 5). 
Box 5 ‘Interprofessional’ or umbrella organisations 
 
The Interprofesional Citrícola Española, or Intercitrus, was formed in 1993 after years of strife 
within the citrus sector. It is constituted as a form of association under the cooperative Law 
19/1977. Intercitrus is based on the French 'interprofesionale' model and combines all parties 
in the industry: farmer organisations and the cooperative sector; independent traders and 
exporters; and the citrus processing industry. The operative principles of Intercitrus are to 
represent the interests of the sector as a whole - for example, by lobbying; equality in 
representation between the constituent subsectors; unanimity in decision making. As an 
institutional mechanism for introducing 'orderly marketing', there is a similarity between the 
'interprofesionale' and the marketing boards of the UK and elsewhere.  
Source: authors 
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3.3 Better marketing: public intervention or private initiative? 
The potential for a response from the private sector to economic incentives and 
opportunities should have created a sense of optimism in creating efficient and 
competitive markets, and overcoming the livelihood constraints of poor producers and 
traders. The propensity of many African peoples to engage in trade should have been a 
sound foundation for market-led economic growth. However, the results of market 
liberalisation were disappointing. The radical reduction in state intervention and not-
infrequent collapse of organised marketing systems did not stimulate a strong private 
sector response, nor generate higher levels of competition. As traders have not been 
willing or able to fill the void, farmers were left without market outlets. Most farmers 
without commercial knowledge or experience have been unable to engage successfully in 
marketing their produce on their own account. The weak development of many poor 
economies, both in historical developing regions and in so-called ‘transition’ economies 
led to greater pragmatism among donors and international organisations, a move 
towards empiricism and away from political and economic dogma. Market coordination 
has to some extent supplanted the ideology of pure competition. 
 
Much is still not understood about the impact of fluctuating policies. Some negative 
underlying assumptions about the role of private traders persist and shape the 
willingness to involve private enterprise in market development (KIT and IIRR 2008). 
The literature also records perverse results of liberalisation: for example, in Southern 
Africa price deregulation has led not to the expected efficiency effects but to increases in 
market margins (Traub, L. N. and Jayne, T. S. 2008). Overall, there is considerable 
ambivalence concerning ‘state withdrawal’ and the persisting unpredictability of 
intervention (Jayne, T., Govereh, M., Mwanaumo, A., Nyoro, J. and Chapoto, A. 2002). 
An unstable institutional environment is one of the principal factors why the private 
sector may choose to avoid engagement with agricultural marketing. 
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Box 6 Summarising characteristics and limitations of collective organisations 
 
3.4 Supporting collective organisation? 
Intervention in agricultural markets has not generally worked in Africa. It is curious, 
nevertheless, that in some advanced agricultural economies, statutory intervention has 
been retained throughout an era of intense economic liberalisation (Box 7). 
Box 7 Meat and Wool New Zealand 
 
Meat & Wool New Zealand (M&WNZ) is incorporated under the Companies Act 1993, and is a 
membership organisation with voting rights proportionate to livestock holdings. It receives 
statutory levies from members paid on all livestock slaughtered and all wool sold. M&WNZ aims 
to improve farm profitability through investing levies in research, development and extension, 
market access and development, and human resources, working across a wide portfolio of 
business activities where collective organisation can achieve what farmers cannot individually 
achieve. Farmers periodically consent to the levy: in August 2009 they voted to continue 
paying levies on sheepmeat and beef (but against continuation of the goatmeat and wool levy). 
Source: http://www.meatnz.co.nz/main.cfm. Accessed 22 December 2009 
Common characteristics? 
• Too many complex functions and objectives 
• management and decision making remote from membership control 
• ‘élite capture’ for the benefit of the few rich and powerful farmers and politicians 
• subject to direct government interference in management 
• inadequate finance and excessive operational costs 
• weak management and capacity building 
• sensitivity to patterns of social organisation and cultural differences 
• less success with food crops that are bulky and of low value, and crops that require 
complicated and expensive processing 
• important role in input supply, especially where low margins discourage private traders and 
where adulteration of inputs is prevalent 
• potential stimulus to competition with private sector enterprises 
Limited expectations? 
• Cooperatives cannot be expected to surmount external constraints in the macro policy 
environment, pricing policies, lack of forex, inadequate infrastructure, and poor regulatory 
functions. They are not an intermediate instrument for the management of marketing by 
the government 
• Any form of grassroots organisation is likely to need support as it engages in activities that 
have been hitherto outside its experience. The assumption of new responsibilities requires 
training and education, and skills often absent among the membership 
• Is ‘associative enterprise’ a movement, or an alternative form of business organisation? 
Source: authors 
 43 
 
The deepening depression over poverty reduction and rural development in poor 
countries and the formalisation of the Millennium Development Goals at the turn of the 
century has led to a reappraisal of policy approaches and instruments to hitherto 
intractable problems. International donors and NGOs have re-engaged with the rural 
sector in general and agricultural development in particular. More widely, the limits of 
liberal policies are being drawn in by increasing policy intervention – the ‘post-
Washington Consensus’ - such as the return to input subsidies in Malawi, and the spread 
of conditional cash transfer payments (CCTs) as a measure to promote an inclusive 
social policy and longer term institutional development (Bastagli, F. 2009). The latter is 
true not just in Latin America but also, for example, of the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) 
programme in Zambia2.  
 
Collective organisation has re-emerged as a development theme, not to support 
agricultural élites, and not just for agricultural development but for growth, poverty 
reduction and environmental management more generally (World Bank 2008): ‘Civil 
society empowerment, particularly of producer organizations, is essential to improve 
governance at all levels…’ (p. 2); performance and competitiveness are key words, and 
operationally producer organisations are said to be constrained by ‘legal restrictions, low 
managerial capacity, élite capture, exclusion of the poor, and failure to be recognized as 
full partners by the state’ (p. 14). Farmer organisations continue to offer a way for 
smallholder farmers to reduce transaction costs and overcome barriers to market 
participation by raising their bargaining power with traders and wholesalers (Thorp, R., 
Stewart, F. and Heyer, A. 2005). Further benefits of collective action include greater 
accessibility of finance, technology and market information (Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, 
R., Hellin, J. et al. 2009) With respect to cooperatives, Cook and Chaddad explain that 
the role of a cooperative for a individual producer had been to improve farmer returns by 
                                          
 
 
2 ‘Social cash transfers (SCTs) have become increasingly popular in Sub-Saharan Africa, because 
growth-centred development policies have failed to reduce poverty. SCTs support the consumption 
of the poorest, and allow them to invest in human and other forms of capital that reduce the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty… SCTs are effective tools of basic social protection. As 
with most things, however, a one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate. Expectations about impact 
need to be moulded by programme design and initial conditions, and vice versa’ Tembo, G. and 
Freeland, N. (2009). Social Cash Transfers in Zambia: What Is Their Impact? One Pager. Brasilia. 
 . 
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lowering production and transaction costs (…) counterbalancing the negative economic 
impacts of market power and reducing producer income risks’ (Cook, M. L. and Chaddad, 
F. R. 2004: 1251). From a policy perspective, facilitating collective action among 
smallholder farmers can result in increased agricultural production as well as adding 
value through processing. 
 
Specifically they are linked to market access and reduction of transaction costs, gaining 
economic scale and market power, formation of social capital, gender inequalities, 
provision of technical assistance and input services, and a techno-economic ‘leader’ role, 
and advocacy. A key issue is the provision of resources and strengthening organisational 
capacity, while avoiding dependence. But there is also recognition of the change in 
context and the external market conditions: ‘… the world of value chains and global 
market forces is creating new challenges for their organizations. The challenge for the 
organizations is how to respond; for governments and donors it is how to assist without 
undermining the organizations’ autonomy’ (World Bank 2008: 154). 
 
Recognising the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the state from agriculture in many 
developing regions, a role is once again envisaged for organisations that retain some of 
the attributes of marketing boards with statutory powers, including levies, particularly 
for product research and development, and international marketing. ‘Widely adopted in 
industrial countries, such levies have been underused in developing countries, despite 
their potential to resolve underinvestment and improve the demand orientation and 
effectiveness of research’ (World Bank 2008). Local organisations can also be a vehicle 
for increasing investment among smallholders in technology and other productive assets 
(Barrett, C. B. 2008). 
 
While such observations are realistic for many contexts, they remain the observations – 
or wish list - predominantly of external players, made within a given set of external 
conditions and from a given political and philosophical viewpoint. While the concepts are 
likely to have relevance, it is difficult not to interpret such initiatives as rolling back 
liberal economic approaches by a few decades. Institutional innovations in advanced 
economies are addressing specific weaknesses of farmer organisations, notably weak 
management and under-capitalisation. Many organisations in Africa are also exhibiting 
characteristics that depart somewhat from the structure and objectives common to 
traditional cooperatives. Examples of these will be discussed later. 
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3.5 A wider perspective: business services, chains and networks 
The policy climate for developing countries has evolved substantially since the reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s. Newer policies have encouraged the provision of business 
development services to stimulate the private sector became a focus of interventions. 
Recently, considerable attention has been attached to improving the performance of the 
wider business environment (White, S. 2005). Latterly NGOs have become a significant 
channel for linking poor people to markets. The entry of individual and corporate 
‘philanthrocapitalists’ (eg the Gates-Rockefeller Alliance AGRA see http://www.agra-
alliance.org/) as donors has added a further dimension to the political economy of 
poverty reduction through market liberalism. The concept of BDS itself has evolved into 
newer formats (Hitchins, R., Elliott, D. and Gibson, A. 2005; Chartock, A. 2006). ‘Making 
markets work for the poor’ (MMW4P) (Ferrand, D., Gibson, A. and Scott, H. 2004; Meyer 
2006) is an approach adopted by various bilateral and multilateral agencies which 
stresses the process of creating opportunities through increasing access to markets, 
achieving equitable and remunerative prices for goods and services, and reducing risk. A 
critical appraisal is appropriate: while MMW4P envisages commercial interventions and is 
‘pro-competitive structures’, it is weak in the policy dimension and draws back from 
advocating innovative public policy interventions (Poole, N. D. 2009). Linkages of 
enterprise concepts to movements advocating collective organisation are also weak. 
 
Development practitioners have also drawn on the value chain approaches more 
commonly used in advanced economies and international commodity exports to analyse 
and improve the performance of market systems. The emergence of value chain analysis 
as an analytical framework is traced to the work of Gereffi (1994; Bair, J. 2005; 
Donovan, J. and Poole, N. D. 2008), and represents a private enterprise perspective on 
the inclusion of producers in market activities. The ability of farmers, for example, to add 
value requires ‘upgrading’ skills, product development, business processes, and through 
investing in physical capital formation. From a development perspective, ‘upgrading’ - 
often with associated capital requirements - is especially important and a range of 
activities for which farmer associations are an appropriate vehicle. As with MMW4P 
approaches, value chain analysis has to be translated into action by taking into account 
the wider stakeholder context: an inclusive ‘task-force’, such as that used in the 
development of the cassava sector in Zambia, is necessary to effect policies for a specific 
sector, in what may be an ongoing process rather than a one-off ‘intervention’ (Chitundu, 
M., Droppelmann, K. and Haggblade, S. 2009). 
 
Another current ‘action research’ approach to improving smallholder inclusion in 
commercial markets is the participatory market chain assessment model, PMCA, (Bernet, 
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T., Thiele, G. and Zschocke, T. 2006). Developed by CIP in South America among 
indigenous potato growers, it purports to be a sectoral initiative, and has been applied in 
Africa, also among Ugandan root crop growers and other vegetable sectors (Horton, D. 
2008). Through these policy approaches runs an increasing focus on poverty reduction 
through establishing sectoral linkages between private enterprise and the rural poor. It is 
a process that is inclusive of all stakeholders, but intensive and costly in application, and 
once again limited in its ‘replicability’ and ‘scaleability’. Nevertheless, the trend in 
participative and inclusive approaches to market development interventions focused on 
the poorest addresses a critical need for new policies that include farmers’ voices – at 
least in Zambia (Concern Worldwide 2008). 
 
Among the most innovative forms of intervention are in fact market developments that 
arise not from the donor and (I)NGO community but from private sector initiatives. 
These are both commercial enterprises developing supply chain relationships such as in 
high value horticultural produce from Kenya (Jaffee, S. 2003), ensuring procurement of 
certified produce such as to meet demand in the fair trade and organic sectors, and the 
new phenomenon of philanthrocapitalists who may invest equity in local production 
systems. Innovation in equity finance of market-oriented agribusiness initiatives is a 
means not only of overcoming capital shortages in rural enterprises. Exercise of financial 
leverage may be a mechanism whereby investors can build the necessary management 
capacity (Poole, N. D. and Penrose Buckley, C. 2006). This is one of the critical areas 
where collective organisations such as farmer associations generally have unexploited 
potential. New models of cooperative organisation and management in advanced 
economies are probably the most innovative form of collective enterprise in the global 
agricultural economy. 
3.6 The new models of cooperation 
Sound financial management, good organisational governance and the potential for free 
riding, remain problems for the more complex cooperatives. Prowse (2008) contends 
that while there are opportunities to be taken advantage of by producer organisations 
there is a danger of expecting too much from them. This point is also made by Bernard 
and Spielman, inter alia (2009). Prowse points out that the World Development Report 
2008 argues that in order for producer organisations to succeed in contract farming they 
need to be involved in policy reform, commodity exchanges, technical support, research 
and management. He argues that the report does not distinguish between different 
types of producer organisation and that more attention needs to be placed on producer 
organisations that resolve the perennial problem of mixed objectives: organisations 
which are market-oriented rather than those that are socially or community-oriented. 
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Moreover, producer organisations need to be clearer about their aims, and that this 
should be reflected in their organisational structure. He cites the market-oriented 
NASFAM in Malawi as one such producer organisation (See Section 5.5). Further, it is 
suggested that managerial mechanisms for resolving disputes between farmers and 
firms need to be more developed. 
 
Section 6 briefly leaves Africa to introduce the latest innovations in reformulating the 
incentive structures in collective marketing that are being developed in more advanced 
economies: these are new models for cooperative enterprise. They illustrate how 
institutional innovation in the form of newer governance systems, ownership patterns 
and financial management within collective organisations has, inter alia, permitted 
cooperative organisations to overcome the problems mentioned above. 
3.6.1 Market re-orientation: evolving models of collective organisation 
Looking at the cooperative, the dominant form of association, the traditional model has 
always faced theoretical and empirical challenges that have required some adaptation as 
the internal market-orientation and the external competitive environment have 
developed. This is true globally. For example, in the 1990s, Dutch fruit and vegetable 
cooperatives recognised that they faced changing market conditions: higher standards of 
quality control and assurance, the various needs to deliver larger volumes, exploit scale 
economies and create bargaining power, and add value through banding and product 
innovation. They addressed the capital-raising limitations and governance/decision-
making constraints of the traditional cooperative model by integrating the wholesaling 
function (Bijman, J. and Hendrikse, G. 2003). NASFAM has been cited as an innovative 
form of organisation. Elsewhere such downstream integration has often taken the form 
of establishing wholly-owned, commercially-oriented marketing subsidiaries of traditional 
producer-owned organisations. Among such organisations, perhaps the most significant 
international cooperative in the agrifood industry is the Fonterra Group of New Zealand 
(Box 8). 
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Box 8 The Fonterra Group 
 
 
Three commercial alternatives to the traditional cooperative model are proportional 
investment cooperatives, member investor cooperatives and the so-called new 
generation cooperatives. Proportional investment cooperatives restrict ownership rights 
to members. These ownership rights are the same as a traditional cooperative in that 
they are non-transferable, non-appreciable and redeemable. However, investment from 
members is expected to be proportional to their patronage. Member investor 
cooperatives depart from the traditional form of cooperative as returns to members are 
distributed in proportion to shareholdings in addition to patronage, whether through 
dividends in proportion to shares or through appreciability of shares. Finally, there is the 
innovative form of new generation cooperative. 
3.6.2 ‘New Generation Cooperatives’ 
The theme of market-oriented producer organisations runs through the literature on so-
called ‘new generation cooperatives’ and extends this commercial orientation further by 
linking ownership rights, investment and governance. Here we examine the model in its 
most developed form through examples from the USA and consider the possible 
applications of the model to specific supply chains in the African context. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, new farmer-owned associative models have emerged in the US. In 
1995 Cook hypothesized that issues concerning property rights would result in a 
The Fonterra Co-operative Group, formed in 2001, is the world’s largest dairy exporter, and 
includes around 70 trading companies throughout the world. It is also New Zealand’s largest 
company and has around 16,000 employees. Responsible for a quarter of New Zealand's 
exports, Fonterra processes around 90% of the milk produced in New Zealand and exports 95 
per cent of New Zealand’s dairy products to more than 140 countries. Customers include some 
of the biggest firms in the global food industry including Coca-Cola, Danone, Domino’s Pizza, 
Kraft, Mars, and McDonalds. Share ownership is restricted to the 11,000 New Zealand dairy 
farmers who supply milk to Fonterra. Shares are held largely in direct proportion to the amount 
of milk supplied in a 12-month dairy season. Capital is raised from investors through issues of 
retail fixed rate bonds. Among its objectives, profitability is foremost, enabled through 
developing relationships with customers, global sourcing, growth, and risk management. ‘The 
composition of the Board is a significant element in the governance of the co-operative. The 
Board is comprised of up to 13 directors. Under the Fonterra Constitution, nine of the directors 
are elected from the shareholder base (Elected Directors), and four are appointed by the Board 
and approved by shareholders at the annual meeting (Appointed Directors)’. 
Source: http://www.fonterra.com/wps/wcm/connect/fonterracom/fonterra.com/Home/. 
Accessed 21 December 2009 
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necessary restructuring of cooperatives (Cook, M. L. 1995). At the same time, Fulton 
(1995) had also hypothesized that technological change and member individualism 
would become barriers to cooperative growth and success in the US agricultural market. 
In this changing context, Cook has subsequently suggested that cooperatives would 
either exit the sector altogether, or would make moderate changes to the cooperative 
structure, or finally would make a radical departure from the existing cooperative norm 
(Cook, M. L. and Chaddad, F. R. 2004: 1249). What has emerged in this last type of 
change is a form of ‘associative’ farmer organisation that has departed significantly from 
the traditional cooperative, but referred to as a ‘new generation cooperative’. 
 
Cook and Chaddad (2004) consider cooperative models in the United States. They draw 
attention to the limitations of ‘Rochdale-adherent’ cooperatives for enterprise 
development: ownership rights are restricted to member patrons, residual return rights 
are non-transferable, non-appreciable and redeemable and benefits are distributed to 
members in proportion to patronage, although investment may not. They point out that 
many traditional cooperatives are now investing in limited liability companies, joint 
ventures or forging other strategic alliances thus developing a vertical investment 
structure to overcome the constraints of the traditional financial model.  
 
In new generation cooperatives, ownership rights are restricted to current member 
patrons, but they are both tradable and appreciable. Ownership rights are in the form of 
tradable and appreciable delivery rights which are restricted to members. Members 
purchase delivery rights on the basis of their expected patronage. This way capital 
investment is proportionate to usage. Members also exercise governance responsibilities 
in proportion to patronage rather than through a one man-one vote system. Ownership 
rights are not usually redeemable (Cook, M. L. and Chaddad, F. R. 2004: 1249-1250).  
 
Following these initiatives in the US, there has been increasing interest elsewhere in new 
generation cooperatives as a way of solving known disadvantages of cooperative 
management. Much of the literature has emerged from NIE analysis, and has focused on 
property rights in conventional cooperatives. One such analysis is provided by Poulton 
and Lyne (2009) who consider the application of institutional economics to market 
development with reference to market coordination. The author examines the issues 
facing producers within cooperatives and consider the benefits to be gained by the new 
generation cooperative model.  
 
Like Cooke and Chaddad, Poulton and Lyne’s NIE analysis suggests that the problematic 
characteristics of traditional cooperatives result in a number of consequences: 
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• The free rider problem: benefits are accrued by individuals who have not invested to 
the same capacity as others. These individuals may be new members, or non-
members who are able to market their produce through an open cooperative.  
• The horizon problem: this problem arises when cooperative members under-invest in 
long-term intangible assets (such as market research or product promotion) because 
they are unable to make capital gains. New members on the other hand are able to 
benefit from past investments without necessarily paying a higher share price.  
• The portfolio problem: compared to investor-owned firms, cooperative members are 
not able to diversify their own asset portfolio and therefore are not able to take 
advantage of their own risk preferences, instead being controlled by a risk-averse 
majority.  
• The control problem: this is the cost of monitoring managers to ensure that they 
make the right investment decisions. This is considered relatively high in traditional 
cooperatives compared to investor-owned firms where dividends are proportional to 
investment and investors are able to internalise the benefits of monitoring efforts. 
Furthermore members of investor-owned firms are able to sanction managers by 
disinvesting, and managers are often shareholders as well, and therefore have a 
personal incentive to behave and manage appropriately.  
• The influence problem: traditional cooperatives are also at a disadvantage when it 
comes to seeking external capital for specific purposes as these assets increase 
financiers’ exposure to risk. This problem raises the cost of external equity, and who 
manages the organisation. Investor bonds may allow external equity without a 
dilution of member-ownership and control. 
 
Once again, such reforms to the traditional cooperative model have been found effective, 
but in a context markedly different from that affecting African smallholder farmer 
associations. It is argued by Donovan et al (2008) that existing cooperatives may find 
that such ‘hybrid’ cooperative forms will provide new opportunities to overcome some of 
the challenges felt by traditional cooperatives, such as investment and governance 
constraints. It is difficult to see the model being transferred ‘as is’; however, attention is 
drawn to the need to develop innovative institutional and organisational relationships 
that are appropriate for African smallholders, including ways other than the ‘soft’ option 
of human capacity building– such as bonds – that might overcome the ‘hard’ capital 
problem. As in the case of new commercial and donor relationships, data and literature 
are not yet available for external analysis. 
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3.6.3 The ‘offensive cooperative’ 
Whilst traditional cooperative forms have been described as defensive, aimed at 
protecting farmers and minimising risk, new generation cooperatives can be seen as 
‘offensive’. Offensive cooperatives have sought ways to cope with falling profit and ‘add 
value’ to their produce at least in part due to their freedom to access and manage capital. 
Thus, the growth of new generation cooperatives has necessitated a ‘realignment of their 
ownership structure’ (Cook, M. L. and Chaddad, F. R. 2004: 1251). Characteristics of 
such new generation cooperatives are a closed membership, a contract-based 
membership, and a homogeneous membership with common objectives and strategies 
(usually only the top 5% of producers who are able to access sufficient capital etc). 
 
Cook and Plunkett (2006) have developed the analysis of the new generation 
cooperative by offering the concept of ‘collective entrepreneurship’: a form of economic 
behaviour adopted by ‘formal groups of individual agricultural producers that combine 
the institutional frameworks of investor-driven shareholder firms and patron-driven 
forms of collective action’. These patron-driven organisations they call ‘offensive 
cooperatives’, for their commercial rent-seeking orientation rather than the traditional 
‘defensive’ model designed to correct ‘market-failure’. As yet undeveloped and under-
researched, this notion of collective entrepreneurship introduces more pointedly the 
hypothesis that the economic behaviour of groups – including groups of developing 
country smallholder agriculturalists – can escape the constraints of bureaucracy and 
learn to be entrepreneurial. 
3.6.4 Is the ‘new generation organisation’ transferable? 
The theme of institutional organisation is recurrent in the literature relating to both 
developed and developing areas. What is needed is institutional and organisational 
innovation in relation to collective enterprise. From Canada and the US the work on new 
generation cooperatives provides an interesting approach to ownership and rights to 
control. In these countries, new generation cooperatives are seen to provide a solution 
to some of the historical and structural problems of cooperatives including issues of 
inadequate property rights and equity problems. Whilst the literature on new generation 
cooperatives may not be immediately applicable to farmer organisations in the African 
context, what can be useful is a greater understanding of where cooperatives may begin 
to make some transformations. In the area of financial management, whilst collective 
decision making may be cumbersome, and top-down decision making is undesirable, 
there may be grounds for seeking alternatives - either in the form of a philanthropic 
benefactor whereby decisions are made on behalf of a (no doubt) trusting collective of 
smallholders; or an investor model: external equity investment with capacity to exert 
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leverage through management building is another potential model. Alternatively, 
bondholders with a financial stake but without governance rights offer the possibility of 
investment without diluting membership control. 
3.7 Key insights 
This section has outlined the historical development of cooperatives in the developed and 
developing world. It has been shown that farmers act collectively in order to overcome 
issues of scale, lack of working capital and lack of power in the market (among other 
factors). However, since the first organised cooperatives, regular themes continue to 
challenge the operation and success of farmers groups such as: 
• Lack of capital to grow in scale and complexity, particularly investment in physical 
assets for value addition through processing and manufacturing 
• Lack of management capacity and good organisational governance 
• Competing market or economic forces that confound traditionally bureaucratic and 
unresponsive structures and strategies 
 
This section has also illustrated the dual nature of farmer groups in acting as both 
business and social movement. This has historically proven difficult to manage and 
resulted in inefficient management and poorly defined goals. Yet farmer groups continue 
to exist and are indeed encouraged by many as a response to imperfect markets and low 
participation of small scale farmers in those markets.  
 
In understanding what does and what doesn’t work for farmer groups, an historical 
analysis can indicate areas of promise and areas of failure. In this regard, clearly, 
intervention has been a necessary factor in providing farmer groups with working capital, 
supporting management structures, improving marketing strategies, assisting with 
market linkages and facilitating legal frameworks. However, the capacity of external 
actors to really benefit farmer groups whilst offsetting the negative impacts of 
intervention has proven elusive.  
 
Some clear lessons emerge from the analysis of the external policy and economic 
environment: 
• Policy: development policies partly reflect political trends and ‘received wisdom’ in 
major donor institutions and bilateral organisations concerned with international 
development. Equally, the domestic policy and regulatory environment and the 
linkages with the external environment shape policy design and implementation. 
Development policies dating from the mid-20th Century have had a formative impact 
on the shape of agricultural markets in Africa, and during recent decades policies have 
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been ill-conceived and changed dramatically. The changeable winds of agricultural 
policy, among other wider influences, have impinged with destructive effects on the 
rural populations. 
• State versus market: underlying the policies is the ideological and pragmatic debate 
about the appropriate role of the state in improving market performance and 
economic growth. The shift from intervention to free market solutions and latterly a 
shift back towards invoking a gentle but visible hand of intervention illustrates the 
power of international and domestic policy – or dogma - over empiricism in this most 
contested of areas. There is compelling evidence from the literature concerning 
transition and developing countries, the ‘East Asian miracle’, and the ‘Green 
Revolution’, that major improvements in well-being have been accompanied, if not 
stimulated by, judicious state involvement, including improving the economic and 
business framework of institutions, and direct provision of public goods and services 
where markets fail. 
• Stakeholder participation: the rise of the stakeholder concept and the resurgence of 
participative approaches have illustrated the poverty of previous policies and 
conceptually narrow directives by policymakers. The demand has shifted towards 
complex policy ‘interventions’ that are multi-stakeholder and inclusive, rather than 
‘magic bullets’. 
 
While much can be learnt from a substantial review of experiences of collective 
organisation, some additional points to note are the following: 
• Objectives: traditional cooperative organisations do not easily deliver on social as well 
as economic objectives; social policy is better separated from enterprise policy 
• Social and environmental responsibilities: commercial supply chain linkages can 
deliver on social and environmental management responsibilities, but these are often 
mediated by donors, NGOs and philanthropic organisations, and are linked to niche 
and vulnerable markets inaccessible to the majority of smallholders 
• A role for the state: statutory arrangements such as levies and interprofessional 
organisations have proven potential in advanced economies to facilitate market 
development; however, they do not substitute, but complement, efficient market 
coordination and investment by the state in public goods; intervention must have a 
‘light touch’, resembling a coordinated market economy 
• Advocacy, but limited politics: while smallholder associations have a potentially 
valuable advocacy role in politics, the converse is not true: political subversion leads 
to inequity and inefficiency 
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• Organisational and institutional innovation: advanced economies have permitted the 
development of innovative institutional and organisational forms which serve as 
examples for developing regions 
• No panacea or magic bullet, but contextualisation: models of institutional and 
organisational forms must be developed locally 
• Entrepreneurism and capital: marketing cooperatives must be entrepreneurial, and 
enterprises can be opened up to external capitalisation – and management input - by 
philanthropic organisations and maybe also commercial investors 
• New generation models: among the less poor new cooperative models may be able to 
revitalise the local agricultural economy and multiply development by creating 
opportunities for poverty reduction among the poorest through the labour market and 
through the promotion of general economic development. 
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4 Challenging external environments 
Changes in African economies have been brought about by a number of national and 
international factors. With the abandonment of government marketing and commodity 
boards, a reduction in state intervention, decentralisation, democratisation, reduced 
barriers to trade through liberalisation, emerging market conditions have created an 
environment in which African producers find themselves facing new challenges as well as 
new opportunities. Farmers now have to deal with the uncertainty of liberalised markets 
as well as the uncertainty that characterises their immediate natural environment. 
Uncertainty affects the ability to fulfil trade contracts or indeed survive through the lean 
season. Market opportunities also have their barriers in the form of standards and 
regulations, certification costs, quality assurance and traceability. Yet, new approaches 
in the areas of microfinance, commercial partnerships and new forms of organisation 
may assist the greater participation of smallholders in markets. With poverty remaining 
a real issue in all African countries, increased participation in global markets may be 
seen as not merely a trade opportunity but a chance to raise agricultural output and 
improve livelihoods. 
 
One significant area that this report does not touch on is the changes and stresses in 
production systems and the natural resource environment due to climate change, water 
shortages and other resources depletion. Comments in the introduction hinted at the 
potential supply response arising from innovation in agricultural technologies. The brief 
section that follows concerns post-harvest challenges that are institutional rather than 
the serious physical, climate-related or technological challenges. 
4.1 Regulations and increasingly specific market demands 
One of the most pronounced changes in the global agricultural economy has been a 
prolific increase in food safety standards. Increasingly produce must conform to a 
required standard of quality and homogeneity and farmers must offer reliable and 
consistent delivery. Institutions must be in place to provide certification and monitoring. 
These changes over the past ten to fifteen years have resulted in many smallholder 
farmers being excluded from global and domestic urban markets (García Martínez, M. 
and Poole, N. D. 2004). This issue has been taken up by a number of authors who seek 
ways of increasing smallholders’ ability to gain access to these valuable markets 
(Reardon, T. and Berdegué, J. A. 2002; Narrod, C., Roy, D., Okello, J., Avendaño, B. and 
Thorat, A. 2009). Nevertheless, the barriers to entry and sustainable involvement in 
non-traditional high value agrifood (niche) product markets in which conditions fluctuate 
with variations in the economic climate are significant obstacles to realising agricultural 
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and rural development on a wide scale (Carletto, C., Kirk, A. and Winters, P. 2007; 
Donovan, J. and Poole, N. D. 2008; García Martínez, M. and Poole, N. D. 2009). 
4.2 Consumer preferences 
Increasingly diverse consumer preferences in the areas of fair trade and organic produce 
alongside an increasing interest in responsible or sustainable sourcing linked to corporate 
social responsibility is influencing agrifood markets (Vermeulen, S., Woodhill, J., Proctor, 
F. and Delnoye, R. 2008). Like food safety standards, mechanisms providing monitoring 
and certification of fair-trade and organic produce must be available to smallholders. 
Social responsibility in supply chains is now receiving more attention than ever before 
both from traditionally interested parties such as NGOs and advocacy organisation as 
well interested private sector and philanthropic institutions. This sector of the market is 
likely to be a challenge to smallholders as well as offering opportunities. It is also subject 
to market and economic fluctuations (García Martínez, M. and Poole, N. D. 2009), as 
consumer willingness to pay is not constant. The characteristics of such niche markets 
also require critical examination: major food manufacturers (eg Cadbury) are facing 
incentives to ‘mainstream’ premium market practices such as fair trade and organic; 
meanwhile, the limits to volume and price premia may impel organic producers to 
reconvert to conventional in order to achieve an economic threshold of productivity. 
4.3 The rise of supermarkets in developing countries 
The rise of supermarkets in Africa has a huge impact on small-scale farmers. In Kenya 
alone figures from 2003-2005 show that 225 supermarkets and 209 hypermarkets 
existed (Neven, D. and Reardon, T. 2004). This phenomenon is the result of both supply 
and demand factors. Increased urbanisation alongside more women in the workforce 
have resulted in greater demand for convenience shopping and convenience food. Lower 
prices of processed food have fed in to this changing demand. Rising real mean per 
capita incomes and a rise of middle classes in African cities has increased demand for 
processed foods and ‘western style shopping’. The expansion of refrigeration also has 
contributed to the growth in demand for supermarkets, as has the increase in car 
ownership and improvements in public transport. On the supply side, liberalised 
economies have attracted foreign investment, and advances in technology and the 
practice of efficient consumer response (ECR) has enabled supermarkets to coordinate 
supply (Reardon, T., Timmer, C. P., Barrett, C. B. et al. 2003).  
 
Small-scale farmers have the opportunity of increased outlets for their produce in 
national and regional markets. In South Africa, 55% of national food retail is supplied by 
supermarkets and in Kenya supermarket output accounts for 30% of all food retail. 
According to data published by FAO in 2003, supermarkets in Kenya bought three times 
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more the volume of produce than the Kenyan export market. Reardon et al argue (2003) 
that the increase in supermarkets in the developing world presents many potential 
possibilities as well as challenges for small farmers. The significance of the supermarket 
phenomenon for smallholder suppliers is great, and the barriers that smallholders face in 
export markets is being replicated – for higher value produce – in domestic markets. It 
is evident from the grey and academic literature that there is a strong potential for 
commercial linkages between smallholders and other farmers and the private sector for 
traditional agricultural export commodities (beverages such as coffee, cacao and tea, 
and fibres such as cotton), particularly those for added niche characteristics such as 
organic and fair-trade, and for high value non-traditional agricultural exports (fruits and 
vegetables). The technoeconomic characteristics of these products are amenable to 
grading and standardisation, and to sophisticated quality control systems, the resources 
required for which generally are beyond the capacity of smallholders. 
 
Domestic markets for lower value and bulk commodities such as the staple products that 
are most closely linked to poverty, under-nutrition and ill-health in East and Southern 
African countries have been less touched by these driving forces. For many African 
smallholders, domestic markets may be much more important than export markets 
(Diao, X. P., Dorosh, P. and Rahman, S. 2003). The potential for boosting these 
apparently lower value sectors has been demonstrated in the case of cassava in Zambia, 
due in part to the public sector investment in agricultural research (Chitundu, M., 
Droppelmann, K. and Haggblade, S. 2009), even if they are not so politically attractive 
to donors and NGOs. 
4.4 Challenges and opportunities? 
The potential for agricultural development to positively impact on smallholders depends 
on the capacities of market actors including government, agroindustry, traders, and 
producers to make product and input markets work more efficiently and effectively, and 
on the capacities of the rural poor to organise effectively into viable businesses capable 
of engaging with markets (Donovan, J., Stoian, D. and Poole, N. D. 2008). However, 
producer organisations are surrounded by legal restrictions, low managerial capacity, 
exclusion of the poorest and often a failure to be recognised by the state as policy 
stakeholders. Furthermore, in each market sector there are likely to be challenges and 
opportunities that require different strategies: a given approach may not work for all 
situations, and disaggregation is necessary as much in analysis as context-specificity is 
in intervention (Poole, N. D., Gauthier, R. and Mizrahi, A. 2007; Chitundu, M., 
Droppelmann, K. and Haggblade, S. 2009; Poole, N. D. 2009). 
 
 58 
In high value markets opportunities exist due to the expansion of supermarkets, as 
noted above (up to 6-7% each year) in developing countries. For traditional bulk exports, 
it is suggested that governments should play a role in regulating fair and efficient 
operations in marketing (World Bank 2008). For the bulky, low value domestic staples 
markets, reducing transaction costs and risk could be ameliorated through the 
development of commodity exchanges and market information systems such as rural 
radio and messaging systems. Barrett (2008) argues that the conceptual and empirical 
evidence on smallholder participation in the trade in staple grains in eastern and 
southern Africa points to interventions in producer organisation, reductions in transaction 
costs, and investment in production technologies and other assets. Such interventions 
could be ‘micro-interventions’, context-specific, and may not be easily ‘upscaleable’. 
Weaknesses in transport systems and infrastructure also are often a fundamental 
constraint. Certain restrictive trade practices within and between African countries also 
impose heavy burdens on regional trade.  
 
Making these trends benefit the rural poor requires improved market infrastructure, risk 
management strategies, support to smallholders and collective action through producer 
organisations. The World Development Report 2008 recommends that donors and 
governments assist by facilitating the organisation of farmer producer groups, training 
for group leaders and facilitating inclusion of women and young farmers (World Bank, 
2008: 14). Further options include the use of targeted vouchers for farmers to purchase 
inputs and stimulate demand in private markets as well as making subsidies available to 
cover start up costs of entry to private distributors. This, the World Bank argues, will 
require a joint effort between public legislative bodies and private institutions to ensure 
food safety, risk assessment and good practice. These emerging trends in both global 
and African markets have had a knock on effect on supply chains in the areas of 
organisation, management, technology, industry structure, procurement and standards 
and finance and may work to either include or exclude smallholders (Vermeulen, S., 
Woodhill, J., Proctor, F. et al. 2008). 
4.5 Key insights 
• The principal lesson from a brief examination of the external environment is that 
opportunities in national and international markets for entry by farmer organisations 
often are finely balanced by a range of barriers to smallholder participation. 
• Cases of successful entry often are often the result of ‘point’ rather than ‘system’ 
interventions, ie context-specific, not typical of the rural economy. Yet the 
requirement for ‘scaleability’ and ‘replicability’ is a response the demand for donor- 
and budget efficiency, and the need to meet international policy targets and goals.  
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• On the other hand analytical approaches to identifying and resolving the weaknesses 
of agricultural development and poverty reduction will be the result of local analysis 
and idiosyncratic approaches and interventions rather than generalisable ‘blueprints’. 
• Balancing opportunities against barriers  requires recognition of significant barriers to 
high value markets that operate against the mass of the smallholders. Successes 
often are the result of individual interventions rather than sectoral initiatives. 
• In each market sector there are a likely to be challenges and opportunities that 
requires different strategies: a given approach may not work for all situations, and 
disaggregation is necessary as much in analysis as specificity is in intervention. 
• The development of global agribusinesses and agri-superpowers – essentially an 
increase in industrial scale and efficiency, and, hence, global competition – is likely to 
whittle away the opportunities for smallholders; 
• Policy makers will increasingly look to scale, efficiency and new technologies 
inaccessible to smallholders to address food security objectives for growing 
populations in an era of climate change and intense social and demographic 
transformations. 
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5 Smallholder farmer associations in East and Southern Africa  
The cooperative model is the dominant form of farmer association. This has evolved 
significantly in advanced economies through institutional innovation by: 
• exploiting flexibility in the regulatory environment, innovative management structures 
have been created that overcome management weakness by introducing outside skills; 
• curtailing the democratic principle that creates inertia, stakeholder incentives and 
participation are rewarded; 
• semi-separation of the commercial activities and prioritisation of the commercial 
objectives, enterprise and performance have flourished. 
 
Moreover, the Achilles heel of collective enterprise has long been capital raising on a 
significant scale. This has become possible by changes in organisational concept and 
structure: 
• increasing member investment, for example in proportion to throughput or equity (in 
the New Generation Cooperative model) and  
• securing other forms of investment (in the European and New Zealand model); and in 
a few cases in Africa, by 
• creating loan guarantee funds and providing insurance for collateral 
 
Where institutional innovation has not occurred – in many developing economies – the 
organisational model is still beset by the familiar weaknesses of inadequate management, 
elite capture, inefficiency, complex and conflicting objectives, lack of accountability, 
undercapitalisation, resulting in basically poor business performance. 
 
Detailed examples from the literature on specific farmer associations in East and 
Southern Africa are not widely available. Some of the published literature covers supply 
chains, other focuses on the work of NGOs and donors working with smallholder groups 
and cooperatives. Most studies are sectoral in nature. Nevertheless, in the following 
section we look at some facets of the market and institutional environment within which 
farmer associations operate in Africa, and then some specific examples.  
5.1 Smallholder association environment analysis 
Attention has been drawn earlier to the importance of the historical, political and market 
context within which smallholder enterprise operates. Understanding the interaction 
between the organisation and the external environment is essential. A framework for 
analysing the internal and external influences on smallholder associations has been 
derived from the marketing and management literature (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Smallholder association environment analysis 
level 1 internal
management
immediate environment
proximate environment
surrounding environment
level 2
level 3
level 4
production/participation/assets
market system/supply chain/related organisations
wider D&S/macroeconomy/politico-legal/networking/donors
weak influence
no influence
strong 
influence
 
Source: adapted from Kachule, Poole and Dorward (2005). 
 
The four levels of the environment move from the central, fundamental, internal 
management of the ‘grassroots’ smallholder association, which in the Malawian context 
is the club. Level one, the club management, interfaces directly with the level two 
environment and of the membership of the club and its activities: its production and 
output, and any assets that together make up the grassroots club organisation. In terms 
of control, the grassroots smallholder association can exert strong influence over its 
internal (level one) and immediate (level two) environments. 
 
In relation to the grassroots smallholder association, the level three environment 
includes related and supporting organisations with which the club has direct contact, but 
only limited influence. These are commercial input and finance suppliers and marketing 
organisations; associations and/or apex organisations that facilitate and provide services; 
and the market systems into which farmers are inserted and which fulfil some or all of 
the functions of transport, storage, processing and exchange (of goods, services, finance, 
information, etc). 
 
The level four environment is the wider economy: characteristics of supply and demand 
of the same or competing products, the macroeconomic variables which impinge on 
system stakeholders, the political and legal environment, and the donor and 
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international community. National public sector organisations can be found within both 
level three (eg those such as Ministry of Agriculture and level four (other ministries and 
executive entities of government that are not directly connected to the particular 
production and marketing systems). 
 
The environmental analysis was used to identify problems within a range of ten Malawian 
smallholder associations, which are summarised below: 
Level 1 internal management environment 
• weaknesses in grassroots club management and finances 
• a low level of management skills among organisation executives 
Level 2 immediate membership environment 
• ineffective democracy and organisation 
• lack of membership commitment 
• poor farming production systems 
• low product quality 
• insufficient physical assets and infrastructure 
Level 3 proximate market chain environment 
• inefficiencies in supporting organisations 
• lack of timeliness in service provision 
• poor quality technical services and inexpert advice 
• failure of services due to 
o low and variable prices 
o withdrawal of services 
o internal mismanagement at association or apex level 
• poor logistical infrastructure and communications 
Level 4 surrounding macro environment 
• low and variable prices for products due to unfavourable demand conditions, often 
due to competition with substitute products 
• high interest rates 
• uncertainties from or within due to: 
• legal framework 
• political will 
• donor climate 
 
Based on a postal questionnaire of producers, visits and interviews at club chairman and 
association executive levels, a typology was derived to summarise the characteristics of 
the 10 organisations in terms of origins, structure, support and objectives. The diversity 
of linkages to other organisations illustrates the complexity of the institutional 
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environment within which smallholder associations operate, and the relationship 
management challenges confronting association leaderships. 
5.2 Organisational typologies and organisational development 
Within the Malawi situation, a variety of organisational types were identified that are 
more or less representative of many small scale farmer associations. It is not an 
exhaustive account: Malawi is one of a number of African countries where parastatals 
such as ADMARC still exist with considerable influence over the operation of other 
independent market players. Here the focus is on collective organisations that include 
smallholder farmers and traders. 
5.2.1 Large diverse service providers 
NASFAM and the NGOs Action Aid, Care and Concern Universal were organisations 
formed out of external (donor) initiatives, often building on a foundation of clubs formed 
during an earlier era, or existing Village Development Committees. They are not typical 
of indigenous farmer associations, but are common types in many African countries 
where attempts have been made by external players to indigenise an external initiative: 
• complex organisations usually providing, or facilitating provision of, a range of 
services to members at the club level 
• input/output services, training and capacity building, provision of information and 
technical advice, advocacy; 
• clear vertical structures and constitutions providing accountability and transparency; 
• skilled executive leadership and trustees creating efficient service delivery and 
networking; 
• considerable donor support; 
• a strong commercial orientation within a broad ‘empowerment’ and livelihoods agenda. 
5.2.2  ‘Phoenix’ organisations 
These were specialised indigenous organisations that developed through crises or the 
collapse of a precursor, such as the Smallholder Coffee Farmers’ Trust that emerged 
from the ‘indigenous’ Mzuzu Smallholder Coffee Association; and ASSMAG that emerged 
from the ‘indigenous’ National Smallholder Seed Producers’ Association. This pattern of 
organisational development through a ‘learning process’ is not uncommon. They had the 
following characteristics: 
• inefficiency and corruption within the secretariats of the previous organisations left an 
‘opportunity space’ for the new organisation led by an active membership; 
• members assumed previous liabilities; 
• focus on cash commodities with strong market linkages; 
• governed by effective constitutions: 
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• strong vertical organisation co-existing with democratic procedures; 
• transparency, accountability and effectiveness; 
• leadership varies: 
• ASSMAG has strong farmer representation and active trustees including 
independent members; 
• SCFT has active member-leaders, and little dependence on the secretariat. 
5.2.3 External initiatives in transition 
These associations were responses to opportunities perceived by outsiders, therefore not 
indigenous but an external initiative. These were still between launch and take-off: 
• ‘soft-focus’ hierarchical organisations: 
• MALEZA: broad-based enterprise development; 
• IDEAA: diversifying from staples to high value products and information; 
• member-driven organisations for specific crops: 
• PAMA: umbrella organisation for paprika clubs and associations; 
• ZIPATSO – a ‘phoenix’ organisation, a tangerine production and marketing group 
looking for outlets. 
5.2.4 Transition stages of collective organisations 
There is a learning process for organisations to grow to maturity. Commenting on the 
transition process, Donovan et al (2008) suggested that the period from launch, through 
take-off to sustainability could be a long period of time. In fact, writing for the Ford 
Foundation, they referred to organisational ‘maturity’, which embraced notions of organic 
development, sustainability and independence, and argued that this process could take 
years or decades, and that short-cuts were necessary from a donor perspective (Box 9). 
Box 9 The ‘long and winding road’ towards viable RCEs  
 
 
‘It is the rule rather than the exception that RCEs reach maturity only after three to five 
decades – despite or, at times because of, intensive, albeit often disarticulated, interventions 
from government agencies, NGOs, development projects, and the like. The long duration of this 
process will increasingly become an obstacle for smallholders, RCEs, and development agencies, 
given rapidly globalizing markets for agricultural and forest products where these enterprises 
meet with both new opportunities and increased competition. It is imperative to identify viable 
shortcuts to RCE development, based on enabling political and legal frameworks, harmonized 
and aligned development interventions, and, most importantly, the delivery of effective and well 
articulated technical, business development and financial services’. 
Source: Donovan, Stoian and Poole (2008: 93) 
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Two important considerations stand out concerning the type of interventions in both the 
institutional framework and more directly within the organisations concerned that might 
promote organisational learning and lead to organisational maturity. First, the potential 
shortcuts presuppose coordination among implementing and facilitating organisations 
in the surrounding environment from the public sector, civil society and the private 
sector. Understanding this environment and the tensions within are important for 
identifying innovation possibilities and intervention points. Various conditions need to be 
satisfied: 
• joint planning is necessary through inclusive, deliberative fora in targeting 
interventions and initiatives in respect of, for example, gender issues; 
• assuring sustainability requires the planning of tangible and intangible investments 
and the planning of the scaling down and withdrawal;  
• sustainability also requires appropriate sequencing of interventions such as training 
and professional services support so that enterprises ‘learn to walk steadily before 
they jog and then subsequently run’; 
• there needs to be a willingness to search out and experiment with alternative 
organisational models that are most appropriately adapted to local circumstances.  
 
Secondly, realism is necessary in respect of: 
• time frames for skills development and organisational learning; in Korten’s terms, 
‘learning to be effective, then efficient and then expanding’ to take advantages of the 
scale economies arising from collective organisation takes time and specific 
investments; 
• expectations concerning relationship building among value chain participants; the 
incentive structures of transactions within organisations, and between organisations 
and their supply or value chain partners and other organisations within the external 
environment require specialised understanding and sophisticated management of 
tradeoffs; 
• priorities: is there a hierarchy of objectives nested within the ideal ‘Triple Bottom Line’ 
of economics, equity and environment? Different stakeholder objectives need to be 
reconciled. 
5.3 Mapping sector structure and organisation 
In the Malawi study a conceptual map of the organisational  environment was helpful in 
order to define more clearly the nature of the diverse organisations and their 
relationships to external stakeholders. The focus was not so much on supply chain 
linkages, but on supporting organisations. Nevertheless, commercial relationships were 
often mediated through supporting or apex-type organisations, and an attempt was 
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made to map and differentiate these relationships with commercial partners from 
relationships with other spheres including the public sector organisations – and the 
political context - and the external support organisations Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Organisational networks and interest groups 
 
Source: adapted from Kachule, Poole and Dorward (2005). 
 
A map of the organisational and institutional environment highlights the incentive 
structures operating, enabling identification of interest groups and understanding of how 
smallholder associations can manage a network of relationships with different and 
competing objectives and priorities. In the case of Malawi, these interest groups can 
serve as both entry points for coordination of investments in sectoral development, and 
as groups for externalising or engaging in advocacy in relation to the wider environment 
on issues of sectoral importance (Figure 3). 
 
• Organisational capital formation: the grassroots smallholder association or club is 
usually linked through second tier associations or marketing action groups to apex 
organisations. Apex organisations typically are national and international NGOs, and 
provide and facilitate a range of services to clubs, associations and cooperatives. 
Linkages are more or less formal, and in many cases are defined by governance 
principles (eg representativeness and democracy) and governance structures 
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(statutes and constitutions) that are often critical factors in smallholder association 
performance. This complex of organisations and relationships is grouped in the solid 
box in Figure 3; 
• Delivery of training for technical skills development with a concomitant danger of 
political subversion: the grouping of public sector organisations and grassroots 
organisations within the small dotted box in Figure 3highlights the relationships 
between the state and the ‘citizen’, which encompasses potential flows of technical 
support towards the grassroots, and advocacy towards the state, but also identifies 
relationships of potential political interference is local development processes; 
• Commercial relationships and supply chain management: the focus on business skills 
and development within the dashed box groups the tiers of producer organisations 
with commercial partners at different levels of the supply chain, from inputs and 
technical advice to marketing of raw products, and storage, processing, 
manufacturing and distribution functions (large dashed line box in Figure 3); 
• Advocacy and governance: apex and supporting organisations and networks within 
the large dotted box in Figure 3constitute a group of sector players that link to the 
public sector at the national and international level as advocacy groups for good 
governance, and efficient, effective and enabling national and international 
institutional frameworks. 
5.4 Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union 
The Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union in Ethiopia was founded in 1999 
comprising 34 coffee cooperatives representing 22,503 smallholders. The Union was 
formed in response the collapse of the price of coffee and market liberalisation, which 
placed farmers in the region into mounting debt as exporters defaulted on their 
payments. The Oromia Union was the first cooperative in Ethiopia to enter the fair-trade 
and organic overseas market. The Union was set up by existing primary cooperatives 
and financed entirely by them through affordable share prices. The second tier 
organisation now includes 129 primary organisations and cultivates 163,192 hectares of 
which 50,692 are certified organic. Farm size averages one to two hectares. Important 
characteristics of Oromia are: 
• Market: 50% of the cooperative’s coffee is sold locally and 50% is exported. The 
cooperative participates in fair-trade only, organic only, fair-trade and organic and 
conventional markets. Over 40% of the cooperative’s export sales go directly to the 
fair-trade organic sector. 
• Organisation: Oromia is a democratic organisation affiliated to a membership-based 
secondary cooperative. Representatives from all cooperative societies attend 
assemblies. Board members are elected by regional representatives. In these respects, 
 68 
it has retained the traditional form of cooperative organisation, and espouses the 
Rochdale/ICA Principles. 
• Contractual arrangements: The cooperative provides technical assistance and training, 
facilitates market linkages, ensuring certification standards, packing and distribution. 
The fair-trade premia go directly to the cooperative societies and are used for health, 
water, sanitation and education. Of other revenue, 30% is placed in the Cooperative 
fund, 5% of which goes on operating costs. The remaining 70% goes to the member 
societies which pay individual farmers based on the amount of coffee sold to the 
cooperative.  
• Supply chain: The market chains for coffee in Ethiopia are either private sales or sales 
though cooperatives. The supply chain is long with coffee beans passing to numerous 
traders before reaching auction. The majority of farmers sell privately but get lower 
returns for their produce. For the Oromia farmers marketing and distribution is 
managed by the cooperative. Having succeeded in becoming a direct exporter of its 
members’ coffee, the cooperative has eliminated 2 or 3 stages in the supply chain 
resulting in greater profit for the farmers 
• Physical capital: the strength of the organisation within the supply chain is 
exemplified by substantial investments in physical infrastructure for storage and 
processing of coffee: tens of pulperies, hulleries and warehouses. 
 
The growth and transition stages of Oromia are illustrative of a necessary learning 
process: the organisation cites its success as being rooted in a number factors, first, the 
managerial capacity which had experienced and committed leadership; second, that the 
organisation emerged from a participatory dialogue between farmers and government 
officials ensuring that it had the backing of the government as well as the farmers. These 
principal factors ensured that the cooperative secured political support as well as 
retaining its connection to the membership base. The cooperative has utilised the 
premiums gained from fairtrade and organic contracts to address social objectives such 
as setting up potable water projects and the building of schools and clinics. The biggest 
challenges facing the cooperative are not unexpected: in the first place, a shortage of 
capital; secondly, there has been difficulty in maintaining good stakeholder relations with 
government due to high personnel turnover in government departments, limited 
education and awareness by government officials and other market participants of the 
complex operations of cooperatives.  
5.5 National Smallholder Farmer’s Association of Malawi (NASFAM) 
NASFAM is a specific case that was included in the study by Kachule, Poole and Dorward 
(2005) that transcends the conventional smallholder organisational environment in 
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Malawi. It shares characteristics with a new generation of cooperative enterprises that 
are attempting to transcend the problems of weak management, undercapitalisation and 
ineffective entrepreneurial orientation which have been referred to earlier. 
5.5.1 Origins 
The association was founded in 1997 as a farmer directed business system. Its 100,000 
participants are smallholder farmers with less than 1 hectare of land. NASFAM came into 
being after a USAID-funded Smallholder Agribusiness Development Project (SADP) was 
implemented by Agricultural Cooperative Development International (ACDI/VOCA). This 
project supported smallholders through improved access to inputs and higher returns on 
agricultural sales, information dissemination and the promotion of collective action 
through farmer associations. The objective behind this project was to increase 
smallholder participation in previously restricted markets such as burley tobacco. Prior to 
liberalisation, high value crops were the sole domain of the estate sector, however, 
during the 1990s with the help of the SADP farmers were organised into ‘group 
businesses’ linked to farmer association structures that provided inputs and services 
such as credit and knowledge transfer and information dissemination. Eventually the 
smallholder groups became formal associations as capacity increased. Aware of the 
benefits of collective action, fourteen associations formed to make the National 
Smallholder Farmer’s Association of Malawi in 1998.  
5.5.2 Structure and operations 
NASFAM has been described as a ‘democratic bottom-up organisation’. Unlike many 
cooperative organisations there are no government officials on the board of NASFAM. Its 
success lies in the ability ‘to develop the commercial capacity of its members and to 
deliver programmes that enhance their productivity’ (Prowse, M. 2008: 4). NASFAM 
provides credit, extension and training, uses economies of scale to reduce transport 
costs and actively seeks external markets for export of produce. It has been able to do 
this with success because of its strong and transparent institutional structure which 
keeps its commercial business separate from development and training programmes. 
The impact of NASFAM has also been attributed to its apolitical stance and its consistent 
donor support from USAID. This support continues to be important in the functioning of 
the organisation, and it is not possible to comment on the likelihood of independent 
organisational sustainability. It works as a multi-functional, multi-sectoral organisation. 
Operations are divided between the commercial and development sectors, registered as 
a profit company and as an NGO. Figure 4 below illustrates the organisational structure: 
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Figure 4 NASFAM structure 
 
Source: authors 
5.5.3 A ‘new generation association’? 
An important characteristic of NASFAM is how it has developed an innovative structure 
that is a complex evolution of the cooperative model. While at grassroots level the 
association has cooperative characteristics, commercial and other entities have been 
created to handle functions that are typically circumscribed by the traditional cooperative 
structure, the commercial and business services functions. Nevertheless, these 
subsidiary organisations fall ultimately within and under the cooperative structure. This 
type of innovative development of the traditional cooperative model has been common in 
advanced economies (eg in the European Union) where cooperatives form a large part of 
the agricultural economy and yet have needed to escape the constraints, particularly 
affecting commercial activities and capital raising, of the strict adherence to the 
Rochdale Principles. Further discussion of innovative forms of cooperative organisation 
outside Africa will be given in the next section. 
 
Thus, NASFAM’s associations jointly own the NASFAM Development Corporation 
(NASDEC) which is a not-for-profit company which owns two subsidiaries, the NASFAM 
Commodity Marketing Exchange (NASCOMEX) and the NASFAM Centre for Development 
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services, and advice on HIV/AIDS and gender issues. Both NASCOMEX and NASCENT are 
run by advisory councils whilst NASDEC is governed by twelve directors, eight of which 
are democratically elected by NASFAM associations, and four are appointed for their 
technical and commercial expertise. 
 
According to the Strategic Development Plan NASFAM’s primary objectives continue to 
be a challenging balance of the social, technical and economic, but with an emphasis on 
the latter: 
• Increased commercial revenue and profit 
• Improved crop quality and quantity 
• Enhanced association performance 
• Expanded member livelihoods 
• Expanded influence on policy 
• Enhanced systems performance 
5.6 Collective and community-based management organisations 
5.6.1 Rural community-based enterprises 
Another form of farmer association has been referred to as the rural community 
enterprise (RCE): ‘a business based on the production of agricultural or forest products 
and services, which are owned by small- and medium scale producers and pursue 
multiple objectives including profit maximisation as only one among many goals’ 
(Donovan, J., Stoian, D. and Poole, N. D. 2008: 12). The less restrictive (in terms of 
legal structure) and more commercial typology is favoured by the Ford Foundation. Rural 
community enterprises have affiliated memberships or registered community members. 
They are legally registered in diverse forms as a cooperative, association or incorporated 
company. The objectives of the enterprise may range from employment, capitalisation, 
public services and resource management. Policy making, management and decision 
making are commonly undertaken by a board of directors and a general assembly and 
residual claims tend to be distributed through usage or equal distribution among 
members (Donovan, J., Stoian, D. and Poole, N. D. 2008). 
 
Rural community enterprises act in a similar way to other forms of collective action in 
that they seek to increase economic and social empowerment through scale: lower costs, 
increased bargaining power in the market, democratic decision making rights and access 
to political and legal arenas, and increased access to services. External players such as 
NGOs and donors have played a significant role in promoting local enterprises as poverty 
alleviation programmes. However, externally driven organisations have usually met with 
failure. At the same time internally driven enterprises have suffered from lack of funds 
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and inadequate capacity. The evidence suggests that a role exists for external actors in 
the development of rural community enterprises, but that attention should be given to 
issues of dependence, governance and ownership for these partnerships to succeed in 
the long term: development and exit need to be planned. 
 
One area where such enterprises tend to depart in practice from the cooperative model 
that persists in Africa is that in the latter a role often is played by the public sector in the 
governance of the organisation. As noted in the overview of the development of 
collective organisations in developing countries, cooperatives tend to be connected with 
or even embedded within government structures. For example, in Malawi, each 
cooperative is required to have a government appointee on its board. Collective 
organisations of a more commercial orientation, so-called RCEs are likely to have 
governance structures free of state involvement, and hence are likely to be freer from 
subversion by political élites. 
 
As an organisational innovation, the closer link to the private sector than to the public 
sector enhances the prospects of an entrepreneurial, market-oriented approach rather 
than a bureaucratic ethos. Donovan et al (2008) cite diverse cases in which a range of 
organisational players is involved in sectoral development. One example is the Ghanaian 
cooperative Kuapa Kokoo (Box 10): 
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Box 10 Kuapa Kokoo 
 
5.6.2 Collective natural resource management organisations 
An increasingly significant form of smallholder association has developed in order to 
manage natural resources. While this form of association does not necessarily have a 
commercial focus – although it can be linked to both marketing of natural resource 
products and environmental management – the dilemmas concerning intra-community 
Ghana partially liberalized cocoa markets in 1992. Several community leaders saw an 
opportunity to sell their cocoa to the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), the state-owned single 
exporter of Ghanaian cocoa. No official support was offered to would-be licensees, as it was 
believed that this would constrain competition and the emergence of a new private sector. 
Considerable obstacles had to be overcome in order to obtain a licence to trade. By mid-1993, 
when regulations were to be implemented for the upcoming season, smallholders attempting 
to start a new, collectively organised company had been effectively thwarted. While they were 
looked on favourably by some in CCB, they lacked capital and credibility. At this point, 
community leaders linked up with two development NGOs, SNV and Twin Trading. Each 
offered support to the local efforts to launch a new producer organisation. There was a short 
and intense mobilization: awareness-raising and village–level discussion and the idea of 
starting a new organisation was followed by an upsurge of local interest in joining the 
initiative. About 2000 smallholders from 22 villages organised their facilities to satisfy the 
authorities and committed to deliver at least 100 MT of cocoa beans per village. The 
cooperative was formed, named Kuapa Kokoo Ltd, with a handful of local leaders representing 
three regions and with financial backing from a loan guarantee by Twin Trading. Kuapa Kokoo 
presented a business plan to the CBC to obtain a licence to trade, which was approved. 
 
In 1998, with The Body Shop, Twin helped Kuapa Kokoo set up the Day Chocolate Company. 
Through the intervention of DFID, who provided another loan guarantee, it was possible to 
issue one-third of the shares of Divine Chocolate to Kuapa Kokoo. The other investors were 
Twin Trading (53%) and Body Shop International (14%). ‘Divine’ fairtrade branded chocolate 
was launched. With the support of other organisations, including Christian Aid, Divine has 
secured considerable market penetration through the UK supermarkets. All of the cocoa in 
Divine Chocolate comes from Kuapa Kokoo and is purchased on fairtrade terms. Divine bought 
1,200 tons of cocoa from Kuapa Kokoo in 2006. However, 98% of Kuapa Kokoo’s production is 
sold at commodity prices to the state-run marketing board in Ghana. Kuapa Kokoo invests a 
fairtrade premium into schools, clean drinking water, mobile medical clinics, and 
entrepreneurship projects for the significant percentage of women farmers who are Kuapa 
Kokoo members (60% of the national executive board of Kuapa Kokoo are women).In 2006 
The Body Shop donated its shares in Day Chocolate to Kuapa Kokoo giving Ghanaian farmers a 
45% stake. In the following year Divine was launched in the US. 
Sources: adapted from Donovan, Stoian and Poole (2008) and 
http://www.divinechocolate.com/about/default.aspx 
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management and relations with external stakeholders have lessons for marketing 
organisations, particularly regarding smallholder participation in community initiatives. 
 
Exclusion of poor people from environmentally sensitive areas and regulation of 
anthropogenic disturbance has been the common approach of governments to resource 
management. This approach has largely failed and new approaches are based on 
devolving responsibility back to local communities. Community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) is a collective institutional innovation to common pool resources 
such as land, forest, water, wildlife, fisheries, biodiversity and the economic and 
ecological systems related to these resources. Community-based management initiatives 
may be a local response to threats and opportunities and as such are rooted in 
cooperative economic organisation at the community level; latterly they have become a 
social or political movement arising from within the wider civil society to address the 
failure of top-down policy processes, and to integrate better the interests, livelihood 
capitals and participation of poor people. Like the historic approach to marketing 
cooperatives, they are increasingly a public policy approach to address the same issues 
of rural organisation. Community-based initiatives are often hosted or initiated by 
intermediary organisations such as NGOs that bridge the gap between civil society and 
local or national government. 
 
The concept is one of devolving resource sovereignty to local beneficiaries, based on two 
affirmations: 
• As a matter of principle, people have rights to share in policy formulation and 
interventions; and 
• in practice, the responsibility for the local organisation is likely to be exercised in a 
manner that is more sustainable, equitable and efficient when primacy is given not to 
the state but to local communities. 
 
A third related issue is the funding of the marketing initiatives for commercial products 
generated out of the natural resources. Together these characteristics and operational 
issues concern the empowerment of local communities and depend on the effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity with which policies are designed and implemented.  
5.7 Participation and adaptation 
There has been an historic tension between external policy interventions and local 
development initiatives to promote poverty reduction and enhancement of the 
livelihoods of poor people. Collaborative efforts have been made through participatory 
approaches (see Bernet et al (Albu, M. and Griffith, A. 2006; 2006; Devaux, A., Horton, 
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D., Velasco, C., Thiele, G., López, G., Bernet, T., Reinoso, I. and Ordinola, M. 2009), 
through deliberative fora such as the ‘stakeholder task force’ approach (Chitundu, M., 
Droppelmann, K. and Haggblade, S. 2009); and through documentation of collaborative 
supply chain ventures (KIT and IIRR 2008), all of which approaches attempt to 
overcome various sectoral and institutional barriers. 
 
Community management of natural resources-based activities (enterprise and 
conservation) give important insights into the participative processes that may enable 
superior organisational performance at the grassroots level (Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, 
R., Hellin, J. et al. 2009). A fundamental question is whether through devolution of 
sovereignty, community-based approaches can achieve sustainable community 
development and economic objectives at the same time. In theory, the economic and 
social potential through the participatory processes of community-based management is 
linked to the nature of the goods and services that are provided by collective 
organisations. As noted, these include: 
• economies of scale in transformation (including production, distribution, innovation, 
finance) 
• access to resource base and external services (finance, business development and 
technical) 
• economies of scale in transaction costs; 
• possibilities of exclusion through creating barriers to entry (membership) – but which 
may conflict with community ownership; 
• security/society/identity/sense of belonging/consensus; and 
• collective coordination efficiencies which can exceed competition efficiencies from 
market solutions and at the same time overcome the under-provision of public goods 
such as social development and capacity building, and also resource management. 
5.7.1 Participation in ‘Bright Spots’ 
Community based initiatives can resolve the sustainability-development dilemma. The 
IWMI report on ‘Bright Spots’ in African agriculture has highlighted the processes of 
development of successful enterprises and communities. Bright Spots are described as 
‘small communities or households that have improved their livelihoods and natural 
resources significantly despite having degraded biophysical and socioeconomic conditions 
around them’ (Penning de Vries, F. W. T. 2005). The problem of capture of the benefits 
by local élites is ever-present, and is likely to be compounded where local institutions 
which lack genuine democratic processes and organisational capacity interact with 
corrupt intermediary or public sector organisations. The equity of intra-community 
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processes is of equal significance, and needs to be addressed constantly in promoting all 
kinds of smallholder farmer organisation. 
5.7.2 ‘Fitness’ and local adaptation of institutional innovation 
The concept of organisational fit was introduced earlier and comes into play also when 
considering the relationships between grassroots organisations and actors from the 
external environment, be they (I)NGOs, civil society, the public sector, or private 
enterprise. Adopting innovative approaches to policy formulation and rural organisation 
may help to address obstacles within the external stakeholder environment – including 
donors themselves. Traditional government ministries responsible for agriculture and 
pro-poor development, and many (I)NGOs may not have the organisational culture and 
human resources that are appropriate or necessary to promote participative approaches 
to grassroots organisational development. New specialist structures may need to be 
created to undertake this role from within the public sector, cutting across disciplines 
and organisations and relevant ministries; or specialised organisations can be contracted 
from the private sector and civil society to link central policy and procedures with 
practice at the periphery. ‘One size’, in terms of external initiatives, will not fit all cases: 
not only must there be ‘organisational fit’, but also fitness, or adaptation to complex, 
diverse institutional situations and location-specific characteristics of markets and society.  
5.8 Key insights 
This section provides an account of a range of farmer associations, their characteristics, 
interactions with other market participants such as the state, public sector as well as 
(I)NGOs. By examining specific organisations it is hoped that we can determine elements 
of success and the causal factors for this success. In the case of NASFAM, a large and 
complex association including primary cooperatives in its structure which has at its core 
a well structured and clearly defined boundary between its business enterprises and its 
developmental and social objectives. It also has a substantial degree of intervention 
from NGOs and the international public sector. So what makes this organisation 
successful? Three factors stand out: first, its multifunctional activities, providing credit, 
training and technological advancement to farmers, second, its strong transparent 
institutional structure which keeps its commercial and social objectives separate, third, 
its activism in seeking external markets. 
 
This section also describes smaller organisations whose nature fits more of a traditional 
cooperative model and yet these organisations are innovating in their approach to 
management and their interactions with other market participants. The Oromia 
Cooperative has succeeded in finding itself niche markets to supply and has managed to 
by-pass traditional routes to external markets by becoming the only direct exporter of its 
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members’ coffee, thereby reducing the length of the supply chain. In these more 
commercially oriented organisations, the key defining factors here are the lack of 
government involvement and the emphasis by the organisation on its commercial 
activity. This conclusion accords with that drawn by Chirwa et al (2005) and much of the 
other literature on farmer association performance and constraints: independence from 
direct public sector intervention is desirable, but support from other stakeholders over a 
limited period, and carefully designed to respect the local environment, is essential. 
 
There is also the issue of empowerment and decision making as illustrated in the 
example of community-based management programmes. The lessons that may be 
learned from these organisations are that local empowerment and decision making are 
key approaches to common resource management. How local communities of people 
organise themselves to successfully manage resources provides insights into 
management strategies that are useful for market-oriented collective organisations. Two 
contrasting views sum up the potential of farmers’ associations: 
• Collective action can work, ‘But a healthy dose of realism is needed when considering 
the applicability and effectiveness of collective marketing. If the incentives and 
enabling conditions for farmer groups to form and operate successfully are missing, 
collective marketing will not be profitable or sustainable’ (Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, 
R., Hellin, J. et al. 2009: 6). Barham and Chitemi (2009), and Bernard and Spielman 
(Bernard, T. and Spielman, D. J.) , likewise, from their respective experiences in 
Tanzania and Ethiopia, are cautious about the limitations to collective models of 
organisation, and acknowledge a ‘threshold’ approach to requirements for successful 
group formation and operation. Indeed, Bernard and Spielman go further to say that 
‘the burgeoning interest in farmer cooperatives in Ethiopia and beyond is not 
amenable to the “one size fits all” strategy that is rapidly evolving (p. 67). 
• Nevertheless, pessimism about smallholder incorporation in high value supply chains 
may reflect a lack of innovative approaches by researchers and development workers. 
 
Both theory and empirical experience suggest that in a given development context: 
• Few grassroots associations of smallholder farmers can become commercial learning 
organisations without external support  
• Entrepreneurism is essential: there must be a minimum level of local initiative and 
leadership and culture of social organisation – human and social capital thresholds 
must be reached, preferably through demand-led provision 
• The poorest smallholders tend to be excluded from participation in and/or 
management of commercially oriented collective organisations 
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• External intervention is necessary in business development to build on local initiatives 
through capacity building, physical investments and creation of supply chain linkages 
to final markets 
• Farmer-level associations and higher tiers of cooperative organisations need to be 
subject to external scrutiny for accountability and performance purposes 
• Complementary investments in public goods such as information and communications 
infrastructure may be necessary – basic physical capital is essential to reduce costs 
and product losses 
• Sustainability requires that an exit strategy be planned 
• Direct intervention by government organisations probably tends to create distortions, 
encourage political patronage, and may be unduly bureaucratic and poorly adapted to 
local circumstances 
• The institutional framework for organisational development should permit and 
encourage novel forms of association, drawing necessarily on expertise in business 
management and learning from successful examples from other environments 
• The benefits of collective organisation are linked mostly to exploiting scale economies 
and reducing transaction costs, opportunities for which arise in high value complex 
markets such as exotic fruits and vegetable exports 
• Management challenges are greater for high value, non-traditional exports with 
complex technoeconomic characteristics than for standardised, bulk or traditional 
agricultural products 
• Equitable rural development may be best stimulated through intervention in bulk pro-
poor products and commodities that are produced, traded and consumed locally, 
giving rise to broader economic multipliers – staples such as cereals and root crops, 
and other fruits and vegetable for which local markets have always existed or have 
been developed 
• Agricultural production and rural marketing ‘thinking’ must be supported by ‘business 
thinking’ in respect of managerial capacities and organisational structures and 
development 
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6 Contractual arrangements: seller-buyer linkages 
The potential for private investment to improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers 
very much depends on the type of contractual arrangements and the relationship 
between the private investors and the rural farming communities. Figure 1 sketched a 
framework for understanding the interplay between interventions, initiatives and market 
types, and how cooperative trading relationships can lead to closer market coordination 
and create potential efficiency gains. The contractual arrangements in smallholder 
markets can differ between crop sectors and are influenced by prevailing local and global 
markets. In African markets the seller-buyer linkages are constructed according to local 
contexts. These contexts vary in terms of the infrastructure available such as road 
access, storage facilities, sanitation, loading facilities, telecommunications and transport. 
There are also variations in knowledge and business skills between buyers and sellers. 
Typically, formalised market information and contract enforcement are weak, therefore 
the relationship between buyers and sellers is key to the functioning of markets. 
 
This section of the report examines different types of inter-organisational coordination in 
Africa. What immediately follows are comments on typologies found in the literature. 
Succeeding section discuss different market linkages in greater detail, using examples 
from Africa, moving from independent trading through specified contractual formats to 
more cooperative supply chain linkages arising from different market and institutional 
players and technological drivers. The final section presents case studies that illustrate 
the trend toward closer vertical coordination in buyer-driven chains and networks.  
6.1 Types of seller-buyer linkages 
On typologies, Mighell and Jones published the seminal work on the use of contracts as 
mechanisms of vertical coordination in the food system in the early 1960s (1963). By 
vertical coordination, Mighell and Jones meant ‘all the ways in which the vertical stages 
of production are controlled and directed, within firms (by the administration) and 
between firms (by the price/market mechanism)’ (p. 10). The means of vertical 
coordination include open market prices, government controls, use of different forms of 
contracts, and integration. 
 
In discussing the different forms of agricultural contracts, they proposed a typology, the 
significant differences within which lie in the extent to which specified processes or 
stages in production are transferred between the parties: 
• market-specification contracts occur where the producer transfers part of the risk 
and management function to another for at least one production period; 
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• production-management contracts call for a more direct participation by the 
contractor in production management; 
• in resource-providing contracts, the contractor also provides inputs, the producer is 
paid for his management, and the contractor assumes more of the production risk. 
 
These fundamental concepts are the basis for subsequent typologies which have been 
developed to give recognition to forms of institutional innovation that have arisen in the 
intervening period. For example, Shepherd (Shepherd, A. 2007) lists a range of types of 
market linkages between primary producers and diverse types of market intermediaries. 
On occasions, farmers can market their product directly to consumers at the farmgate or 
in local farmers’ markets. Traders who buy at the farmgate or at market will be local or 
regional traders. In addition, farmers can sell through a leading farmer, or through a 
collective organisation, or to an agroprocessor or exporter. Contract farming schemes 
operate primarily for the more commercially oriented – larger scale, more highly 
capitalised, more ‘professional’ farmer. Transactions cost theory, and many empirical 
studies, suggested that cost and risk reduction are important drivers for both sellers and 
buyers in determining the chosen marketing arrangements. Efficient forms of exchange 
are shaped by the degree of development of the institutional environment and the 
complexity of the product and market system. 
 
The review by Benfica et al (2002) outlines different types of arrangements 
characterised according to the level of vertical coordination between farmers, traders 
and processors: 
• spot market trading - processing/trading with independent producers 
• contract coordination - processing/trading with contract farming 
• vertical integration - plantation agriculture with processing 
• rural association and cooperatives - community integration 
 
Focussing on three major sub-sectors in Mozambique; maize, cashew, and cotton, 
Benfica et al consider the advantages and problems of three common alternative 
contractual arrangements between farmers and investors which are developed below. 
Cooperatives and rural associations, they argue, do not fit into the same continuum of 
vertical coordination. Nevertheless, in Mozambique, NGOs are a chosen vehicle for 
promoting rural collective organisations by identifying business opportunities, 
encouraging and facilitating group formation, provision of technology and inputs, and 
facilitating market linkages, even with large scale processors in contract farming 
schemes. ‘From a poverty reduction standpoint, perhaps the most salient aspect of these 
arrangements is the local ownership of the processing facilities. This ownership means 
 81 
that any profits from processing are more likely to be spent or re-invested locally, rather 
than expatriated or spent on non-local tradables. Thus, consumption linkages, multiplier 
effects, and potential poverty alleviation are potentially very strong’ (2002: 12).  
6.2 Independent producers 
Spot market trading/processing with independent producers involves transactions 
between agro-industries and independent smallholders without a contractual 
arrangement. In this situation, the relationship is a marketing one in which each party 
makes their own independent decisions based on their knowledge of the market, 
conditions and preferences. This form of arrangement benefits from flexibility and the 
ability to respond quickly to market conditions ‘on the spot’. Maize, the staple crop in 
Mozambique, is traded predominantly through independent producers. It is labour 
intensive and in high demand. Production is dispersed throughout Mozambique and 
producers sell to traders independently. The problems associated with this arrangement 
are typical of the high transaction costs, limited market power of producers and poor 
infrastructure evident in rural marketing in Africa: 
• Price uncertainty  
• Inconsistent quality 
• Unstable supply 
• Limited bargaining power of the independent producers 
• Lack of reliable storage facilities 
• High costs and losses due to inadequate transport links and market information 
 
By way of alleviating some of these problems, contract farming is considered as an 
alternative arrangement. However, for this to be viable productivity needs to be 
increased for farmers to take a greater return on their produce, and the risk of default 
needs to be reduced through stronger contract enforcement. Benfica et al (2002) argue 
that contract farming may be more successful than independent arrangements if certain 
requirements are met, such as an emphasis on premium prices for quality produce, a 
strengthening of the legal system, facilitating the development of farmer associations 
including literacy and capacity building programmes in rural areas. (These characteristics 
are often enjoyed by organisations, including traditional cooperatives, which have access 
(often donor-supported) to higher value markets and fair trade, or ‘ethical’, premia). 
 
The cashew trade in Mozambique is also dominated by independent producer 
arrangements, under which, it is the processors who face the barriers to success such as: 
• Competition with exporters 
• Inconsistent quality and supply 
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• High dispersion of sources 
• Lack of capital 
 
For the farmers, cashew production is a high risk activity and characterised by unreliable 
income generation (Benfica, R., Tschirley, D. and Sambo, L. 2002: 43). Farmer 
productivity is low due to a lack of inputs, in particular disease control. The case of 
cashews is illustrative of the significant impact of the technoeconomic complexity of both 
product and processing on marketing arrangements and the constraints to market 
access of the poorest smallholders. Given sufficient support, it is evident that farmers 
can become organised and trained to deal in higher value markets, but the appropriate 
organisational models may be complex and non-replicable (Hellin, J., Lundy, M. and 
Meijer, M. 2009), and capacity building interventions therefore costly.  
6.3 Contract farming 
Contract farming entails an agreement between the farmers and processors. These 
agreements can be formal or informal. Farmers may benefit from services provided by 
the processing firms such as credit, seeds, fertiliser and technical assistance. This type of 
contract has developed in Sub-Saharan Africa as a response to imperfect markets and 
poor service provision (Benfica, R., Tschirley, D. and Sambo, L. 2002). Contract farming 
may nevertheless result in the exclusion of the poorest households who lack the assets 
and resources to overcome entry barriers. 
 
Cotton production is characterised by a high need for inputs and processing, thus making 
contract farming arrangements most common. However, there is a high degree of credit 
and input market failure. The cotton market is hindered by the following problems: 
• High default rate on seasonal credit for production due to price competition in the 
output market 
• High default rate due to weak legal system causing poor enforcement and loan 
recovery 
• Farmers’ dependence on cotton companies for inputs and finance 
• Poor market information and high infrastructure costs 
 
For the cotton sector, the author of the study argues that it is unlikely that alternative 
contractual arrangements would be more beneficial. However improvements, can be 
made through strengthening farmers’ bargaining power in the market by encouraging 
the formation of collective farmer associations (Benfica, R., Tschirley, D. and Sambo, L. 
2002: 45). 
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The cotton sector study by Poulton et al (2004) in Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe examined the phenomenon of small independent sellers 
and their relationships with buyers, which were difficult to characterise as just one type 
of contractual arrangement. However, they explored the problems identified by Benfica 
et al, highlighting the interplay between the prevailing market structure and optimum 
market coordination mechanisms between producers and the large scale buyers and 
processors. They identified three prevailing patterns of farmer-buyer linkages: 
• ‘concentrated, market-based’ sectors which were successful in meeting common 
coordination challenges while still maintaining reasonable prices to producers 
• local monopoly systems with direct purchases which offered a workable solution to 
coordination problems but lacked any competitive dynamic 
• sectors with multiple small players which were fiercely competitive, but lacked 
effective coordination. 
 
They concluded that different sectoral structures are observed in the different study 
countries, with a different role for the state appropriate for each organisational and 
institutional context, which depends on the recent history and policy framework. 
Consequently, different types and levels of institutional intervention were necessary to 
facilitate exchange and create the information about relationships that reduces 
transaction costs: ‘All sector types, therefore, face their own particular challenges in 
striking the competition–coordination balance’ (Poulton, C., Gibbon, P., Hanyani-Mlambo, 
B. et al. 2004: 535). 
 
Other literature on improving contractual relationships points to the role of cultural ties 
and suggests that social relationships can have a positive effect on agricultural trade. 
Benfica et al (2002) describe the role of ethnic ties between Mozambican traders and 
Indian buyers in the cashew sub-sector in decreasing transaction costs of trade. Social 
relationships have also proven to be a factor in successful economic exchange between 
markets actors in Madagascar (Fafchamps, M. and Minten, B. 2002). The importance of 
interpersonal relationships have been shown to have a positive impact in the areas of 
credit provision, risk sharing, trade flows, circulation of information, market 
opportunities, risk mitigation, market regulation and the regularity of trade flows (Barr, 
A. M. 1997; Fafchamps, M. and Lund, S. 1998). Fafchamps and Minten’s research in 
Madagascar indicates that successful traders are successful because of the social 
networks that they have developed: ‘The capacity to successfully join networks of 
solidarity may well be critical to their long-term prosperity as it shelters them from some 
of the risks of business and enables them to invest more, grow more rapidly’ (1999: 30). 
In a later paper they argue that improving market efficiency would rely on the 
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development of ‘supportive institutions’ that would favour social networks built on trust 
(Fafchamps, M. and Minten, B. 2002: 203). 
6.4 Enhanced private sector supply chain linkages 
This section aims to outline some of the farmer-private sector strategies that have 
emerged as a result of changing contexts in global markets.  
6.4.1 Supply chain networks 
The institutional mapping of farmer associations in Malawi in an earlier section 
highlighted the complexity of the organisational environment, but perhaps underplayed 
the significance of linkages between smallholder associations and the private sector. 
There is a growing phenomenon of specialization in multi-agent supply chain 
arrangements whereby small-scale farmers engage with multiple stakeholders from both 
public and private spheres. Among others, two case studies of successful collaborations 
can be found in Tanzania and South Africa. In South Africa, Thandi group, a wine and 
fruit group has collaborated with Capespan an exporter who provides mentorship, 
financing, skills transfer and capacity building of the Thandi initiative. 
 
In Tanzania, with the assistance from a development agency, the Mara Smallholder 
Horticultural Project has formed itself into marketing groups with direct links to suppliers 
of horticultural produce for hotels and camps. With support in the areas of knowledge 
and skills each group currently has a vegetable marketing committee that collects 
produce from individual farmers, grades, packs and delivers to the hotels. Prices are pre-
agreed with the farmers. The potential to link agricultural production to other economic 
sectors such as tourism has been noted elsewhere (Donovan, J. and Poole, N. D. 2008), 
although the likely extent of the impact of such approaches to rural poverty reduction in 
Africa are probably limited. 
 
Recent commercial initiatives have also come about through the involvement of NGOs. A 
case in point is NASFAM, although at a smaller scale, local NGOs can have a facilitating 
capacity in making buyer- seller linkages more effective. However, Shepherd (2007) 
illustrates that this may carry risks, particularly of dependency. In South Africa for 
example, an NGO facilitates a link between a pulping company and small-scale contract 
farmers. The NGO manages a program which aims to commercialise timber production 
on subsistence farms. Farmers enter in to a purchasing agreement with the company 
and in return they receive assistance in the form of tree seedlings and an interest free 
loan for planting, maintaining and weeding the plantation. Farmers also benefit from 
technical assistance from extension officers. This assistance is managed by the NGO on 
behalf of the company. Despite high returns for farmers, the level of dependency is 
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possibly too high and too costly for the company. Shepherd considers this high level of 
dependency unsustainable.  
 
Commenting on the feasibility of small farmers accessing new supermarket supply chains 
in Kenya (in particular fresh fruit and vegetables), Neven and Reardon (2005) consider 
three areas in need of attention: 
• creation of efficient supply chains 
• increase in scale of production and marketing among smallholders 
• high working capital requirements to meet post-harvest specifications, and 
organisational costs 
 
Neven and Reardon argue that the supply chains need to be redesigned to incorporate 
the ‘creation of new market facilitators’ such as outgrower schemes. They advocate the 
development of new, smaller farmer markets near local residential areas that are able to 
facilitate an effective procurement system.  
 
In other areas direct links between farmer and retailer have been possible and successful 
through initial support from local NGOs. Small-scale farmers in southwest Uganda are 
now supplying an urban fast-food outlet. Working as a group, farmers are able to 
stagger planting times in order to be able to achieve regular and standard supplies of 
potatoes. Relationships between the farmers and the retailer have been strengthened 
through personal visits. This has been essential to the success of the contract as trust is 
achieved through communication and interaction between all parties and enabled the 
NGO to have a lesser role in the continuing buyer-seller link. For a depiction of the 
supply chain for potatoes to Nando's which illustrates the complex institutional 
arrangements, see Kaganzi et al (2009). 
 
We have noted on various occasions that smallholders find access to high value non-
traditional export markets very demanding. Nevertheless, Narrod, Roy, Okello, Avendaño, 
and Thorat (2009) conclude from their study of collective action and public-private 
partnerships in Kenya and India that pessimism about smallholder incorporation in high 
value supply chains may reflect a lack of innovative approaches by researchers and 
development workers: in their cases, public-private sector collaborative actions enabled 
farmers to overcome significant food safety barriers. But the responsibilities of each type 
of player (public and private sector) was distinct: farmers need to establish good 
commercial linkages with buyers; the government has a role in correcting specific 
market failures, without otherwise intervening on commercial chain activities. 
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6.4.2 Philanthropic initiatives 
Market interventions for supply chain development are coming from an increasing 
diversity of sources compared with the historic state-managed initiatives. The provision 
of alternative sources of capital enables the development of supply chain linkages 
through market-oriented interventions. One new type of organisational player is the 
philanthropic organisation, parallel in some ways to the NGO sector. An example of this 
form of supply chain is the Rwandan Farmers Company. Owned in trust by The Clinton 
Hunter Development Initiative (CHDI) all profits are returned to the farmers. With a 
$100 million investment over 10 years, CHDI seeks to act as a catalyst for sustainable 
economic development. It works with national governments, communities and other 
stakeholders to assist with production as well as initiating social programmes in the 
areas of health, water and sanitation. In the case of Rwanda, CHDI assisted the 
government in the purchase of fertiliser, which is reported to have resulted in an 
increase in coffee crop yields of 240%. The company then aided 6,500 coffee farmers in 
setting up Misozi Coffee Company which by the end of 2007 had increased its sales by 
30% and production by 20%. The Misozi Coffee Company is now part of a larger group 
of farmers who market their own coffee under the brand name Rwandan Farmers and 
sell direct to the retailers in the United Kingdom. This way, farmers receive 100% of the 
profit.  
 
A similar approach is now being replicated in Malawi where cotton and wheat are 
important commodities. Such intervention in staple foods rather than high value export 
crops is novel, even though market access is more simple and transaction costs lower 
(Hellin, J., Lundy, M. and Meijer, M. 2009). For wheat, a strong domestic demand has 
meant that Malawi imports 80% of its wheat, despite being a country capable of 
producing local wheat. CHDI has assisted the Neno Hills Farmers’ Association in gaining 
access to funding which has enabled them to purchase improved wheat seed and 
fertiliser. CHDI has bought the harvest of a local wheat miller at a 50% higher price than 
received in the previous period. The role played by philanthropic organisations in acting 
as a catalyst for change in markets is an interesting one as it serves to bring external 
investment and technical support with a sense of social responsibility.  
6.4.3 Commercial interventions 
A recent issue of the journal Food Policy was dedicated to research on commercial 
collaborative supply chain activities in different regions around the world. Narrod et al 
(2009) examine the response of farmer groups to increasingly stringent food safety 
requirements. Increased concerns for food safety has resulted in organised producer 
groups formulating new strategies for coping with these demands. In the developing 
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world smallholders are faced with increased market demands yet continue to be 
constrained by issues of scale and lack of information. As noted earlier, producer groups 
have been shown to overcome these issues through collective behaviour and coordinated 
actions. Narrod et al (2007: 10) outline clearly the role of collective action in overcoming 
the challenges of food safety standards: 
• Procurement of information about markets and the process of contract formation 
• Dissemination of information relating to food safety standards 
• Undertaking lumpy investments 
• Procurement of cheaper inputs through bulk buying  
• Accessing extension services 
• Establishment of traceability systems 
• Maintaining a group monitoring system 
• Collective marketing leading to reduced costs and uncertainty 
• Grading and certification 
• Collaboration with marketing experts 
• Maintaining a group monitoring system 
 
Despite the exclusion of many smallholders from supply chains that have stringent food 
safety standards, some smallholders have succeeded in gaining and maintaining access 
to this market. Narrod et al (2009) consider the innovative institutional mechanisms that 
have aided smallholders retaining these market linkages, namely various internal 
collective organisational initiatives combined with external private-public partnerships. In 
Kenya, farmer groups have been the dominant link between smallholders and the 
market. During the 1990s farmer group size was reduced to fewer than 30 per group in 
order to facilitate third party monitoring. Farmer groups also began to monitor 
themselves. This was achieved through a system of penalties for violation of rules. 
Smaller groups meant that it was easier to train farmers and use self-monitoring as a 
mechanism to keep costs down for buyers. The way in which membership was organised 
was also transformed. Membership became controlled with new members only being 
accepted by recommendation of existing members and then being subjected to a vote by 
all members based on their conduct in other social or economic organisations. The 
groups are governed by an elected committee that enforces rules and negotiates 
contracts with exporters. The farmer groups are financed by member contributions. 
Narrod et al (2009) argue that these adaptations to the traditional organisation of farmer 
groups enable them to participate in more complex food markets.  
 
The second mechanism, public-private partnerships, has assisted in the setting up of 
farmer groups. The Government of Kenya in partnership with the Japanese International 
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Cooperation Agency (JICA) established a company to mobilize and recruit smallholders 
groups. Other public- private partnerships include the Business Management Service 
Development Programme (BMSDP) run by DFID and the Horticultural Crops 
Development Authority who together trained horticulture service providers to serve 
smallholders. NGOs have also formed partnerships with private firms to train and provide 
financial assistance to farmer groups to enable them to secure certification.  
 
Barham and Chitemi (2009) considered key factors in the success of farmer groups in 
Tanzania to be group maturity, strong internal organisation and functioning group 
activities. They also conclude that a strong asset of natural capital – enabling satisfaction 
of the technoeconomic demands of product markets - was essential to improving market 
opportunities. Their study examines Agricultural Marketing Systems Development 
Programmed (AMSDP), a planned change initiative in Tanzania which aims at improving 
smallholders market access through reforming the regulatory and taxation systems; (2) 
improving market infrastructure; (3) establishing agricultural marketing information 
systems; and (4) strengthening producer groups and creating market linkages. 
6.4.4  ICT innovations and e-markets for smallholder inclusion 
Information and communications technology is undoubtedly having a massive impact in 
developing countries. Liberalisation has led to a dramatic expansion of radio services in 
many developing countries, with content often well-targeted to local users. There are 
many initiatives to put in place new ICT such as internet access, satellite, cellular and 
mixed information and communications technologies. Such interventions often concern 
the provision of market information and the linking of sellers and buyers. Some ICT 
initiatives derive from donors, such as the Rockefeller-funded Kenyan Agricultural 
Commodities Exchange, KACE (Adesina, A. 2004; Mukhebi, A. 2005).  
 
MISTOWA (Box 11) enables users to access web-based market services: offers, 
transport, and storage and market news, in addition to prices, by commodity, region, 
country or market: 
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Box 11 E-information systems for farmer and trader organisations 
 
 
Dramatic increases in the level of connectivity in telephone connectivity have occurred 
since the liberalisation of the telecommunications sectors in many developing countries 
that have permitted the expansion of cellular networks. Probably the biggest impact of 
technological innovation has been the use of cell phones to increase access to marketing, 
anecdotal reports of which testify to an extraordinary growth in farmer-market 
communication. Focusing on specific IT interventions may miss the point that organic 
growth of this commercially-driven market has been dramatically important. 
Nevertheless, doubts persist about the extent and speed of rollout of new technologies 
to remote areas with low populations and difficult terrain, and also about the inequity 
effects that may result: such interventions are unlikely to be ‘pro- the poorest’, those 
remote and small-scale farmers and associations with limited economic and social assets. 
 
ICT innovations and electronic marketing is generally targeted at individual farmers. 
While there are general limitations to such interventions, particularly if they are heavily 
donor-funded, there are also questions about whether these approaches to market 
development can be of help to the poorest farmers and to smallholder farmer 
associations. Nevertheless, anecdotes about the experiences of farmer organisations in 
Malawi suggest that making a computer and internet connection available to each 
organisation would be of massive assistance in improving internal organisation and 
business management, and access to external markets. In these respects there is a 
considerable potential role for private sector donors and investors, coupled with training 
in business management from civil society and third sector organisations. 
Following the structural adjustment-induced redesign of West African cereal boards at the end 
of the 1990s, RESIMAO (Réseau des Systèmes d’Information de Marché de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) 
was created as a network of market information systems for West Africa in 2000 in Bamako, 
Mali, now serving various other Franco- and Anglophone countries. The primary function is 
regular price data collection for a range of crops in hundreds of national markets which is 
undertaken primarily by national public sector staff. Data currently available on the internet 
sites are maps, regional price averages and locations, prices for the last 4 days, and network 
facilities to plot dates and analyse trends. The intention is to use diverse media for 
dissemination – GIS, internet-based systems, bulletins, radio, TV and SMS. One of the partners 
is MISTOWA (Market Information Systems for Trader Organisations in West Africa), a 4-year 
regional project begun in 2004 and implemented by IFDC and mainly funded by USAID. Its aim 
is to strengthen the capacity of farmers and traders to access and use the data, with the 
ultimate aim of promoting agricultural trade in the ECOWAS region… 
Source: Poole (2006: 35) 
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6.5 Case Study: Twin Trading Partnership 
Supply chain development initiatives driven by private capital have significant potential 
for scale and replicability, and therefore poverty reduction impact. Many have begun 
through the intermediation of NGOs and some, such as the Kuapa Kokoo-Divine 
Chocolate enterprise in Ghana have been converted into viable commercial enterprises, 
independent, it is hoped, of donor support, and therefore sustainable (Donovan, J., 
Stoian, D. and Poole, N. D. 2008). To the extent that such initiatives can be driven by 
private capital, the impact can extend beyond the scope of donor-driven market access 
projects. Apart from Kuapa Kokoo, various examples exist, and this section introduces 
one such case.  
 
The Twin Trading Partnership is owned by small scale-producer organisations and works 
with 39 producer groups in the sectors of coffee, cocoa, sugar and nuts across Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. As well as working with producer groups, Twin is one of the 
main companies behind other ‘ethical’ organisations such as Cafédirect, Agrofair, Divine, 
Liberation and OKÉ. Together with the Fairtrade Foundation, Oxfam, Root Capital, Hivos, 
World Bank, Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO), Twin invests in supply chain 
management, strengthening producer organisations, fair trade brands, information and 
knowledge generation with the aim of influencing policy and increasing market 
awareness amongst producer partners.  
 
Twin has 24 farmer organisations with over 1000 cooperatives representing over 
163,000 farming families. Twin Trading offers the following business support services: 
• Planning and forecasting 
• Contract administration 
• Logistics and shipping 
• Quality control 
• Price risk management 
• Pre-finance 
• Market analysis 
 
Twin also runs a Producer Partnership Programme that aims to strengthen the internal 
management systems of member producer organisations (Box 12): 
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Box 12 Features of the Twin Producer Partnership Programme 
 
 
A subsidiary of Twin Trading is Liberation. Liberation works with 22000 smallholder 
producers in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In Malawi, Liberation buys from the Mchinji 
Association of Smallholder Farmers, MASFA, as subsidiary of NASFAM. Approximately 
30% of MASFA’s output is Fairtrade. In Mozambique, Liberation deals with the 
cooperative Ikuru which has 8500 members organised into smaller collectives producing 
peanuts, cashews, sesame and beans. Members of Ikuru also produce for the organic 
market. The producers own a collective share of 42% of the company.  
 
• Governance and organisational strengthening: with the management and elected leaders of 
producer organisations providing workshops, advice and mentoring on cooperative practice, 
leadership, internal communication, understanding the market and business context 
• Business basics: supporting producer organisations to develop business skills and systems 
for accounting, harvest planning, basic quality control. This is achieved through direct 
coaching and consultancy and the design of easy-to-use tools 
• Certification: assisting producers to maintain Fairtrade and organic certification by providing 
information and training on standards, and giving direct support before and after 
inspections. Twin has also developed internal control systems and lobbies certification 
bodies to ensure that standards work for smallholders 
• Planning and evaluation: Twin supports producers in the areas of operational planning, 
strategic planning, and evaluating individual activities and events. This is achieved through 
workshops, coaching and consultancy 
•  Price risk management: helping producer organisations develop risk management tools 
and strategies. Twin provides training on risk management at a basic and advanced level 
and offers regular market updates and analysis 
•  Quality control systems: providing technical support and advice to nut and cocoa producers 
to improve product quality and develop quality control systems. Twin has also developed 
training resources and workshops on quality control systems at all levels including cupping 
workshops for farmers, and zoning programmes to identify high quality coffees 
• Quality management systems: increasing efficiency and sustainability in producer 
organisations enable them to manage different voluntary and obligatory market 
requirements in one integrated management system 
• Training of Trainers: Twin has developed participative and dynamic training methods and is 
developing an on-line learning resource for its producer partners 
• Advocacy and Networks: By representing the interests of producers and developing 
producers’ capacity to defend and promote their interests in key arenas Twin works to 
increase producers’ voice. Because the producers have a majority stake, Twin represents 
the interests of small-scale producers in the market... 
Source: http://www.twin.org.uk/PPP#Governance. Accessed 15 April 2009 
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The company strategy is based around member ownership and supply chain 
management. Its website compares the following supply chains (Box 13): 
Box 13 Liberation perspective on supply chains 
 
 
With these organisations, the focus is on ensuring that farmers get access to markets 
and that the company has access to producers who are able to fulfil their contract. Twin 
Trading describes itself as a commercial business. Not enough is yet known about the 
commercial orientation, sustainability and poverty reduction impact of such new 
initiatives: reliable literature is scarce, but there is potential to develop primary 
analytical research in this area and also action research by donors to design and 
evaluate alternative models. 
6.6 Key insights 
These examples serve to reiterate some of the points already made about organisations 
• Firstly, context specificity prevails: organisational types and institutional frameworks 
and market linkages are significantly and historically path-dependent, and of these, 
market linkages above all are influenced or determined by the technoeconomic 
characteristics of the specific agricultural products concerned.  
• Also, it is self-evident but easily ignored that the private sector processing, 
manufacturing and distribution sectors need raw materials, and the cases presented 
illustrate how commercial linkages can be formed which have the effect of linking 
producers to markets on satisfactory terms. Partnership programmes such as that 
• The traditional supply chain: you have a farmer or farmers’ co-operative which sells goods 
to the middleman, who sells them to a local exporter, who sells them to an importer in 
Europe, who then sells them to the retailer. Everyone along the way demands some 
margins that affect the price you pay for the finished product which does not take into 
account the real cost of production and living expenses of the farmers. 
• The fair trade supply chain: replaces the middleman and the exporter with a farmers’ co-
operative who then sells their goods directly to an importer in Europe, who sells on to the 
retailer. As you can see by shortening the supply chain more profit stays with the farmers 
since there are less margins to be paid, as well as all the knowledge from exporting their 
own products. 
• The Liberation supply chain: takes fair trade to the next stage bringing producers right up 
the supply chain replacing the last link, the importer, through a farmer- owned brand, 
which empowers smallholder producers by involving them in ALL decisions taken and 
maximising THEIR profits. Through Liberation’s supply chain farmers sell DIRECTLY to the 
retailers in Europe. 
Source: adapted from http://www.chooseliberation.com/about_us/. Accessed 17 December 
2009 
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operated by Twin can provide the essential capacity building to create viable business 
relationships in competitive markets. While little attention has been given to private 
firms’ efforts in exercising corporate social responsibility, it must be acknowledged 
that there may be valuable examples also from major agrifood firms such as Nestlé 
which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
• Nevertheless, it is not philanthropy but profitability that drives the private sector, nor 
that partnership programmes such as Twin can necessarily be mainstreamed. 
• Examples of the impact of new technology illustrate how markets can be expanded to 
include smallholders, even though there remain barriers to entry by the poorest. But 
new technologies such as IT – and maybe other technological and institutional 
innovation – may be best introduced not through project-type interventions but as 
constituents of an enabling framework with public good characteristics. Public-private 
sector partnerships are likely to play a part in the delivery of such public goods. 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper has sought to review the various types of organisational forms of farmer 
associations and the different relationships that they have with other market participants. 
The outline of the historical emergence of farmer associations in Africa has illustrated the 
diversity of group types, ranging from small informal farmer groups to large farmer 
cooperatives, different sources and levels of initiatives and interventions, a variety of 
contexts, and changing policy approaches. What unite these groups are the challenges 
that are posed by the context of the African market in today’s global agricultural 
economic climate, and the need to build effective enterprises in local markets that can 
multiply development for wider poverty reduction. 
7.1 Recapitulating collective weaknesses 
It has been noted that traditional farmer organisations face a number of internal and 
external difficulties and contradictions. Internally: 
• the question of origin, be it a grassroots initiative or an external intervention plays an 
important part in shaping the structure and performance of a collective organisation; 
• there are often mixed and sometimes conflicting objectives; 
• often there is a lack of start up finance and capital accumulation, weak internal 
management capabilities, opaque governance and accountability; 
• skills fall short of adequacy making organisational capacity inefficient. 
 
External challenges include 
• high barriers to entry and asset threshold requirements prevail in competitive markets 
- strict food standards, certification requirements, and changing consumer 
preferences and demands. 
• unsupportive public policies that may constrain innovation, lack of government or 
political backing – or on the contrary, political patronage and interference; 
• inadequate transport and communications infrastructure; 
• weak business, legal and regulatory structures. 
 
Regarding the donor environment: 
• intervention can be ideologically driven and excessive; 
• initial support levels may be unsustainable; 
• insufficient recognition may be given to the long-term nature of organisational 
learning and capacity building. 
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7.2 Diagnostic and summary framework 
The framework offered at the beginning suggests a typology of two types of internal 
initiatives and/or external interventions, institutional and organisational innovations, 
which can usher in a more entrepreneurial and more focused collective organisation. 
Broadly speaking, these innovations should be aimed at redressing the management and 
organisational weaknesses that impair commercial performance, and reducing the 
transaction costs that cause weak or missing markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
By means of a summary, the following conceptual map of organisations, market linkages 
for smallholder farmers, and intervention patterns  (Figure 5) is a first effort to provide a 
framework for analysing potential interventions. Apart from the organisation itself and 
the external market and institutional environment, the product and market types in 
respect of technoeconomic characteristics and potential for poverty reduction are 
important dimensions in the developing agricultural economy which map, albeit 
imperfectly, onto the dimensions of institutions and organisations presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 5 Mapping markets, interventions and initiatives 
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7.2.1 Products and markets 
There is a relationship between the product and market type, and the form of market 
organisation and contractual relationships. Many of the initiatives and interventions 
discussed have been concerned with the bottom right, top right and increasingly the top 
left quadrants: these are characterised by higher level of business organisation and/or 
stronger institutions. But smallholder participation in these markets is limited because of 
the weaknesses summarised above. Where smallholders do participate, often it is the 
result of specific and costly interventions, related to ‘complex’ (high specification) 
products requiring sophisticated linkages to niche markets that are not really viable 
opportunities for the majority of poor smallholders. The sustainability of such initiatives 
is more likely if they are led by the private sector rather than donors and civil society, 
although the contribution of supporting organisations may be very helpful. However, 
these success stories are not easily replicable and upscaleable. 
 
Markets in the bottom left quadrant, arguably most important for wider poverty 
reduction, have enjoyed little attention: these are staple foods such as cereals and roots 
with little value addition entering traditional rural market systems. These sector have the 
potential to boost the availability of local food supplies (obviously not the same as 
entitlements). Opportunities exist for a multiplying effect within the local economy as 
increased production leads to demands for labour, and marketable surpluses require 
transport, storage and processing services.  
7.2.3 Intervention options 
This diagram aids in our understanding of farmer organisations and the different markets 
in which they participate. We can consider commercial institutions, (I)NGOs and public 
sector initiatives to be operating most effectively in the bottom right, top right and top 
left quadrants. Notable innovation has occurred which is the development of retailer-led 
national and international market or supply chains. But these link to growers of higher 
value products who are the agricultural middle class, and employ contract farming 
models. There are some exceptional cases of collective enterprise, usually with 
considerable external management and financial support. Generally these are sectors 
and initiatives are the 'low hanging fruit' of agricultural marketing in East and Southern 
African countries. These markets do not exhibit sectoral market failure. Therefore, 
replicable, upscaleable sectoral investment is unjustified and probably would tend to 
crowd out the viable private initiatives. They do not reach the mass of smallholder 
farmers. 
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Yet, the real challenge for pro-poor development initiatives is to reach the poorest 
(agriculture-dependent) smallholders with the lowest level of household assets who 
cannot easily turn to income earning opportunities other than agriculture; the bottom 
left quadrant. Targeting these farmers means innovations in markets for bulk staple 
commodities grown for incomes and consumption– for example in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
for products such as cereals and starchy staples. It is in this quadrant that local and 
regional markets can be strengthened, and where historical and ‘outmoded’ patterns of 
intervention (such as marketing boards) have been least supplanted by organisational 
and institutional innovations such as the more entrepreneurial initiatives by intermediary 
organisations, the more sophisticated commercial supply chains, the more advanced 
trading mechanisms such as futures and electronic markets.  
 
We have cited approaches and interventions such as CHDI, and grain warehousing 
systems, and some new production technologies are examples where the domestic low 
value ‘staples’ sector has received support. CHDI works in the export sectors of coffee 
and cotton but is also beginning to intervene in domestic sectors such as wheat 
production in Malawi. The initiative has aided wheat farmers to access capital for inputs 
and assisted in the organisation of 1200 wheat farmers. CHDI has also negotiated higher 
prices for wheat. The cassava value chain in Zambia is also receiving sector-level 
support, with the aim of linking smallholder production to the many potential industrial 
markets. Another example is potatoes (admittedly to a high value market) in Uganda. 
There are important lessons from the other quadrants, such as the Twin Trading 
partnership scheme and Kuapa Kokoo, which suggest how business development 
services and organisational development can be shaped to serve the poorest. The 
Liberation approach to participatory processes has proved to be a valuable experience, 
even if inclusion of the poorest on a widespread scale is unlikely. Large numbers of 
farmers can be involved, but these linkages are still ‘point’ initiatives rather than sectoral 
interventions. It is in this quadrant that markets in Africa are least perfect, or fail, with 
negative consequences for local food security and wider economic development. 
 
Institutional and organisational innovation can be: 
• Group performance and auditing – much is known about how and how not to initiate 
farmer groups. External assistance is needed in building sustainable business models. 
One potential intervention to improve a) the institutional environment and b) business 
performance, is the creation of a national organisational capacity or ‘ombudsman’ to 
monitor and audit grassroots organisations and to improve organisational 
accountability; 
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• An ombudsman-type organisation can also be tasked with coordinating the regional or 
national delivery of the needed complex of business development and information 
services, with the aim of managerial capacity building. Together with the auditing role, 
higher levels of managerial skills can shorten the duration of the organisational 
learning cycle, and attenuate the wasteful experience of ‘phoenix’ organisations and 
‘not-so-creative destruction’ among farmer groups. Independence from Ministries of 
Cooperatives is important, to ensure an entrepreneurial rather than a bureaucratic 
skill set and culture; 
• Cooperative innovation – relaxing the Rochdale/ICA Principles to introduce into 
cooperative governance higher level management capacity and more external finance. 
New models of cooperation may reconcile or simplify the complex incentive structures 
and agency problems within collective organisations. Again, local business and legal 
skills are needed, as well as new legislative frameworks for associative organisations; 
• Finance – sources additional to members and donors are equity investments by 
philanthropic organisations and bond issues to private investors which will help to 
overcome capital constraints and yet not necessarily dilute member ownership. On 
the other hand, new modes of investment may enable investors to ‘leverage’ 
improved management capacity; 
• Contracts - adopting written standard form contracts may furnish two major 
advantages over existing verbal agreements. The first is the planning purpose: it may 
be that the greatest value of standard contracts is to reduce uncertainty by specifying 
the terms of an agreement; second, adoption of written agreements may boost the 
informal ‘rules’ of business attitudes and ethics; 
• Sectoral initiatives – drawing on the interprofessional model, the formation of industry 
‘umbrella associations’ for promising sectors can replicate the efficiencies sought 
through commercial supply chain management driven by private sector firms: 
functions such as sharing of information, participatory problem diagnosis, joint 
investments, contractual clarity and informal remedial mechanisms. 
7.2.4 Entrepreneurial characteristics of the farmer group 
Examples from the literature illustrate that factors such as group size (Narrod, C., Roy, 
D., Okello, J. et al. 2009), asset endowments, functioning group activities and strong 
internal organisation (Barham, A. and Chitemi, C. 2009) affect the success of farmer 
groups in effectively participating in markets. Other work highlights the skills base 
necessary to ensure sustainable market linkages (Shepherd, A. 2007). Another area that 
has been illustrated in the literature is the degree to which groups can respond to 
changing consumer demands. This has been illustrated in the case study of the Oromia 
Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union which made an early entry into the fairtrade and 
 99 
organic overseas market and become a direct exporter. With a threshold level of 
entrepreneurial skills, such farmer groups can become responsive businesses. 
7.2.5 Focus on business: re-envisioning cooperatives 
A further issue regarding the structural management of farmer organisations is the need 
for clearly defined boundaries between the organisations’ social responsibilities to 
members and its commercial aspirations. Social empowerment must not be confused 
with economic empowerment. One organisation that has achieved such clarity through 
structural means is NASFAM. An important characteristic of NASFAM is how it reflects a 
complex evolution of the cooperative model similar to that in European countries with a 
strong cooperative tradition, and elsewhere, such as Fonterra. While at grassroots level 
the association has cooperative characteristics, commercial and other entities have been 
created to handle functions that are typically circumscribed by the traditional cooperative 
structure, the commercial and business services functions. Democratic characteristics 
are retained to varying degrees.  
 
To sum up, organisational and institutional innovations have enabled the following: 
• exploiting flexibility in the regulatory environment has permitted the development of 
innovative management structures that overcome management weakness by 
introducing outside skills; 
• curtailing the democratic principle that permits inertia has created new stakeholder 
incentives, and ensures that participation are rewarded; 
• with the semi-separation of the commercial activities and prioritisation of the 
commercial objectives, enterprise and performance have flourished; 
 
Moreover, the Achilles heel of collective enterprise, capital raising on a significant scale, 
has become possible by: 
• increasing member investment, for example in proportion to throughput or equity (in 
the New Generation Cooperative model) and  
• securing other forms of investment (in the European and New Zealand model); and in 
a few cases in Africa, by creating loan guarantee funds, issuing bonds, and providing 
insurance for collateral 
 
Where institutional innovation has not occurred – in many developing economies – the 
organisational model is still beset by the familiar weaknesses of inadequate management, 
élite capture, inefficiency, complex and conflicting objectives, lack of accountability, 
undercapitalisation, resulting in basically poor business performance. 
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7.2.6 The role of external players 
 (I)NGOs, Government, private firms, philanthropic institutions, partner agencies all have 
a role to play in facilitating the movement of commodities or produce from farm to 
market. However, what is apparent from the literature is that the potential for these 
external players to have a positive and sustainable impact on farmer groups may depend 
on their coordinated ability to shift the focus from production to market interventions.  
 
The development of farmer organisations in many countries in Africa will continue to 
depend on external players for investment, equity, management and technological 
inputs. What is necessary is a realistic timeframe? Achieving sustainability is a very long 
term process: if ‘economic sustainability’, or organisational maturity means 
‘independence of outside agencies’, then considering the common trajectory of farmer 
collectives, such initiatives may take years or decades to reach maturity. They suggest a 
wide range of measures that might begin to hasten this process. 
7.2.7 The supply chain  
Creating links between farmers and traders, importers or even retailers, thereby cutting 
out middlemen and maximising profit margins for farmers is one approach common to 
the fairtrade sector and is also utilised by philanthropic institutions. Supply chain 
shortening is usually combined with modifications in the structure of the organisations, 
skills and management capabilities, processing and marketing. Such chain or sectoral 
approaches are sometimes rooted in an adversarial approach to marketing and 
contractual relationships, and do not necessarily reflect the positive and sometimes 
essential functions of market traders, nor the principles and practice of collaborative and 
cooperative modern supply chain management.  
 
 101 
References 
Abbott, J. and Creupelandt, H. (1966). Agricultural Marketing Boards: Their 
Establishment and Operation. Rome. 
  
Adesina, A. (2004). Making Markets Work for the Poor in Africa. Presentation for seminar 
on 'Innovative Approaches to Meeting the Millennium Development Goals for Africa'. 5 
July. Addis Ababa. 
  
Agrimonde® (2009). Scenarios and Challenges for Feeding the World in 2050. Summary 
Report. Paris and Montpellier. 
  
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for 'lemons': quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3 (August)): 488-500. 
  
Albu, M. and Griffith, A. (2006). Mapping the market: participatory market chain 
development in practice. Small Enterprise Development 17(2): 12-22. 
  
Alene, A. D., Manyong, V. M., Omanya, G., Mignouna, H. D., Bokanga, M. and Odhiambo, 
G. (2008). Smallholder market participation under transaction costs: maize supply and 
fertilizer demand in Kenya. Food Policy 33(4): 318-328. 
  
Arhin, K., Hesp, P. and van der Laan, L. (1985). Marketing Boards in Tropical Africa. 
London, Routledge. 
  
Ayres, C. E. (1957). Institutional economics: discussion. American Economic Review 47: 
26-27. 
  
Babcock, H. E. (1935). Cooperatives the pace-setters in agriculture Journal of Farm 
Economics 17(1): 153-156. 
  
Bair, J. (2005). Global capitalism and commodity chains: looking back, going forward. 
Competition and Change 9(2): 153-180. 
  
Barham, A. and Chitemi, C. (2009). Collective action initiatives to improve marketing 
performance: Lessons from farmer groups in Tanzania. Food Policy 34 (1): 53–59. 
  
Barr, A. M. (1997). Social Capital and Technical Information Flows in the Ghanaian 
Manufacturing Sector. Oxford, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford 
University, . 
  
Barrett, C. B. (2008). Smallholder market participation: concepts and evidence from 
eastern and southern Africa. Food Policy 33(4): 299-317. 
  
Bastagli, F. (2009). From Social Safety Net to Social Policy? The Role of Conditional Cash 
Transfers in Welfare State Development in Latin America. Working Paper. 60. London, 
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion/London School of Economics and Political Science. 
  
Benfica, R., Tschirley, D. and Sambo, L. (2002). The Impact of Alternative Agro-
Industrial Investments on Poverty Reduction in Rural Mozambique. Research Report 
Series, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Directorate of Economics, 
Republic of Mozambique: 75. 
  
Berdegué, J. A., Biénabe, E. and Peppelenbos, L. (2008). Innovative practice in 
connecting small-scale producers with dynamic markets: synthesis report. London. 
  
 102 
Bernard, T. and Spielman, D. J. (2009). Reaching the rural poor through rural producer 
organizations: a study of agricultural marketing cooperatives in Ethiopia. Food Policy 
43(1): 60-69. 
  
Bernet, T., Thiele, G. and Zschocke, T., Eds. (2006). Participatory Market Chain 
Approach (PMCA): User Guide. Lima, Peru, International Potato Center (CIP) - Papa 
Andina. 
  
Bijman, J. and Hendrikse, G. (2003). Co-operatives in chains: institutional restructuring 
in the Dutch fruit and vegetable industry Journal on Chain and Network Science 3(2): 
95-107. 
  
Carletto, C., Kirk, A. and Winters, P. (2007). Non-Traditional Crops, Traditional 
Constraints: The Adoption and Diffusion of Export Crops Among Guatemalan 
Smallholders. Washington, DC. 
  
Chartock, A. (2006). BDS is dead; long live BDS! Small Enterprise Development 17(1): 
8-12. 
  
Chirwa, E., Dorward, A., Kachule, R., Kumwenda, I., Kydd, J., Poole, N. D., Poulton, C. 
and Stockbridge, M. (2005). Walking tightropes: supporting farmer organisations for 
market access. ODI Natural Resource Perspectives. 99. London. 
  
Chitundu, M., Droppelmann, K. and Haggblade, S. (2009). Intervening in value chains: 
lessons from Zambia's Task Force on Acceleration of Cassava Utilisation. Journal of 
Development Studies 45(4): 593-620. 
  
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica ns 4(November): 386-405. 
  
Commons, J. R. (1934). Institutional Economics: its Place in Political Economy. New York, 
Macmillan. 
  
Concern Worldwide (2008). Unheard Voices: Marginal Farmers in Zambia's Western 
Province. London, Concern Worldwide. 
  
Cook, M. L. (1995). The Future of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives: A Neo Institutional 
Approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(1153-59): 1153. 
  
Cook, M. L. and Chaddad, F. R. (2004). Redesigning cooperative boundaries: the 
emergence of new models American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86(5): 1249-1253. 
  
Cook, M. L. and Plunkett, B. (2006). Collective entrepreneurship: an emerging 
phenomenon in producer-owned organisations. Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics 38(2): 421-428. 
  
Devaux, A., Horton, D., Velasco, C., Thiele, G., López, G., Bernet, T., Reinoso, I. and 
Ordinola, M. (2009). Collective action for market chain innovation in the Andes. Food 
Policy 34(1): 31-38. 
  
Develtere, P., Pollet, I. and Wanyama, F., Eds. (2008). Cooperating out of poverty: The 
renaissance of the African cooperative movement. Geneva, International Labour 
Organisation. 
  
Diao, X. P., Dorosh, P. and Rahman, S. (2003). Market Opportunities for African 
Agriculture: an Examination of Demand-side Constraints On Agricultural Growth. . 
Development Strategy and Governance Division Discussion Paper 1. Washington, DC, 
IFPRI. 
 103 
  
Donovan, J. and Poole, N. D. (2008). Linking smallholders to markets for non-traditional 
agricultural exports: a review of experiences in the Caribbean Basin. Inputs for strategy 
formulation by ‘EU-ACP All Agricultural Commodities Programme’. AAACP Paper Series. 
No. 2. Rome. 
   
Donovan, J., Stoian, D. and Poole, N. D. (2008). Global Review of Rural Enterprises: The 
long and winding road to creating viable businesses and potential shortcuts. Turrialba, 
Costa Rica. 
  
Fafchamps, M. and Lund, S. (1998). Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines, 
Department of Economics, Stanford University , Stanford, CA. 
  
Fafchamps, M. and Minten, B. (1999). Relationships and traders in Madagascar. Journal 
of Development Studies 35(6): 1-35. 
  
Fafchamps, M. and Minten, B. (2002). Returns to social capital among traders. Oxford 
Economic Papers 54(2): 173-206. 
  
FAO (2008). Food Outlook, November 2008. Global Market Analysis. Rome. 
  
FAO (2008). World Food Situation. Rome. 
  
FAO (2009). How to Feed the World in 2050. Rome. 
  
Ferrand, D., Gibson, A. and Scott, H. (2004). 'Making Markets Work for the Poor': an 
Objective and an Approach for Governments and Development Agencies. Woodmead, 
South Africa. 
  
Fulton, M. (1995). The future of Canadian agricultural cooperatives: a property rights 
approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77: 1144-1152. 
  
García Martínez, M. and Poole, N. D. (2004). The development of private fresh produce 
safety standards: implications for developing Mediterranean exporting countries. Food 
Policy 29(3): 229-255. 
  
García Martínez, M. and Poole, N. D. (2009). Fresh Perspectives 4 – Ethical consumerism: 
development of a global trend and its impact on development, pp 18-21. Standard 
Bearers: Horticultural Exports and Private Standards in Africa. Borot de Battisti, A., 
MacGregor, J. and Graffham, A. London, International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) and Natural Resources International (NRI). 
  
Gereffi, G. and Korzeniewicz, M., Eds. (1994). Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. 
Westport, CT, USA, Greenwood Press. 
  
Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford, OUP. 
  
Harris, L. (1980). Agricultural cooperatives and development policy in Mozambique. 
Journal of Peasant Studies 7(3): 338-352. 
  
Hellin, J., Lundy, M. and Meijer, M. (2009). Farmer organization , collective action and 
market access in Meso-America. Food Policy 34(1): 16-22. 
  
Hitchins, R., Elliott, D. and Gibson, A. (2005). Making business service markets work for 
the rural poor – a review of experience. Small Enterprise Development 16(2): 10-23. 
  
 104 
Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-
91. 
  
Horton, D. (2008). Facilitating pro-poor market chain innovation: an assessment of the 
participatory market chain approach in Uganda. Lima, Peru. 
  
Hubbard, M. (1997). The 'new institutional economics' in agricultural development: 
insights and challenges. Journal of Agricultural Economics 48(2): 239-249. 
  
Jaffee, S. (1995). Transaction Costs, Risk and the Organization of Private Sector Food 
Commodity Systems. Marketing Africa's High Value Foods. Jaffee, S. and Morton, J. 
Dubuque, IA (USA), Kendall Hunt. 
  
Jaffee, S. (2003). From Challenge to Oppurtunity: Transforming Kenya's Fresh Vegetable 
Trade in the Context of Emerging Food Safety and Other Standards in Europe. 
Washington. 
  
Jayne, T., Govereh, M., Mwanaumo, A., Nyoro, J. and Chapoto, A. (2002). False promise 
or false premise? The experience of food and input market reform in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. World Development 30(11): 1967-1985. 
  
Kachule, R., Poole, N. D. and Dorward, A. (2005). Farmer organisations in Malawi: the 
organisation study. Final report for 'Farmer Organisations for Market Access', DFID Crop 
Post Harvest Research Programme (R2875). 
  
Kaganzi, E., Ferris, S., Barham, J., Abenakyo, A., Sanginga, P. and Njuki, J. (2009). 
Sustaining linkages to high value markets through collective action in Uganda. Food 
Policy 34(1): 23-30. 
  
KIT and IIRR (2008). Trading up: Building cooperation between farmers and traders in 
Africa, Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), Amsterdam and International Institute of Rural 
Reconstruction (IIRR), Nairobi. 
  
Korten, D. C. (1980). Community organisation and rural development: a learning 
process approach. Public Administration Review 40(5): 480-511. 
  
Lamont, J. T. J. (1993). Agrarian reform in the Republic of Moldova (CIS): the potential 
role of agrifood cooperatives. Oxford Agrarian Studies 21(1): 59-81. 
  
Lazonick, W. (1991). Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
  
Lele, U. and Christiansen, R. E. (1989). Markets, Marketing Boards and Cooperatives in 
Africa: Issues in Adjustment Policies. Washington. 
  
Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, R., Hellin, J. and Dohrn, S. (2009). Collective action for 
smallholder market access. Food Policy 34(1): 1-7. 
  
Meyer (2006). Making market systems work? For the poor? Small Enterprise 
Development 17(4): 21. 
  
Mighell, R. L. and Jones, L. A. (1963). Vertical Coordination in  Agriculture. Agricultural 
Economic Report. No 19. Washington, DC. 
  
Mukhebi, A. (2005). Commodity exchanges: KACE. Paper presented at the CTA Expert 
Consultation on Market Information Systems and Agricultural Commodity Exchanges: 
 105 
Strengthening Market Signals and Institutions, 28-30 November. Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands, Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation ACP-EC (CTA). 
  
Narrod, C., Roy, D., Okello, J., Avendaño, B. and Thorat, A. (2009). Public-private 
partnerships and collective action in high value fruit and vegetable supply chains. Food 
Policy 34(1): 8-15. 
  
Neven, D. and Reardon, T. (2004). The rise of Kenyan supermarkets and the evolution of 
their horticulture product procurement systems. Development Policy Review 22(6): 669-
699. 
  
New, S. J. (1997). The scope of supply chain management research. Supply Chain 
Management 2(1): 15-22. 
  
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
  
Penning de Vries, F. W. T., Ed. (2005). Bright Spots Demonstrate Community Successes 
in African Agriculture. Working Paper 102. Colombo, Sri Lanka, International Water 
Management Institute. 
  
Piesse, J. and Thirtle, C. (2009). Three bubbles and a panic: an explanatory review of 
recent food commodity price events. Food Policy 34(2): 119-129. 
  
Poole, N. D. (2009). Making markets - and institutions - work for the poor. Eurochoices 
8(1): 40-45. 
  
Poole, N. D., Gauthier, R. and Mizrahi, A. (2007). Rural poverty in Mexico: assets and 
livelihood strategies among the Mayas of Yucatán. International Journal of Agricultural 
Sustainability 5(4): 315-330. 
  
Poole, N. D. and Penrose Buckley, C. (2006). Innovation Challenges, Constraints and 
Opportunities for the Rural Poor. Background Paper for the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), Rome. Wye. 
  
Poole, N. D., Seini, A. W. and Heh, V. (2003). Improving agrifood marketing in 
developing economies: contracts in Ghanaian vegetable markets. Development in 
Practice 13(5): 551-557. 
  
Poulton, C., Gibbon, P., Hanyani-Mlambo, B., Kydd, J., Maro, W., Larsen, M. N., Osorio, 
A., Tschirley, D. and Zulu, B. (2004). Competition and Coordination in Liberalized African 
Cotton Market Systems. World Development 32(3): 519-536. 
  
Poulton, C. and Lyne, M. (2009). Coordination for market development. Ch 5, pp. 102 -
132. Institutional Economics Perspectives on African Agricultural Development. Kirsten, 
J., Dorward, A., Poulton, C. and Vink, N., IFPRI. 
  
Prowse, M. (2008). Making contract farming work with cooperatives: producer 
organisations and poverty reduction. Capacity.org. 
  
Reardon, T. and Berdegué, J. A. (2002). The rapid rise of supermarkets in Latin America: 
challenges and opportunities for development. Development Policy Review 20(4): 371-
388. 
  
Reardon, T., Timmer, C. P., Barrett, C. B. and Berdegué, J. (2003). The rise of 
supermarkets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 85(5): 1140-1146. 
 106 
  
Schumpeter, J. A. (1947). The creative response in economic history. The Journal of 
Economic History 7(2): 149-159. 
  
Sey, A., Lowe, B. and Poole, N. D. (2010 forthcoming). The use of intellectual property 
protection by micro, small and medium scale enterprises: a case study of Ghana. 
Enterprise Development and Microfinance. 
  
Shepherd, A. (2007). Approaches to Linking Producers to Markets. Rome. 
  
Spielman, D. J. and Pandya-Lorch, R., Eds. (2009). Millions Fed: Proven Successes in 
Agricultural Development. Washington DC, International Food Policy Research Institute. 
  
Spooner, N. (1994 ). Transition to the market in agriculture in Ukraine: priority areas for 
reform. Oxford Agrarian Studies 22(1): 17-29. 
  
Tembo, G. and Freeland, N. (2009). Social Cash Transfers in Zambia: What Is Their 
Impact? One Pager. Brasilia. 
  
Thorp, R., Stewart, F. and Heyer, A. (2005). When and how far in group formation a 
route out of chronic poverty? World Development 33(6): 907-920. 
  
Traub, L. N. and Jayne, T. S. (2008). The effects of price deregulation on maize 
marketing margins in Southern Africa. Food Policy 33(3): 224-236. 
  
Vermeulen, S., Woodhill, J., Proctor, F. and Delnoye, R. (2008). Chain-Wide Learning for 
Inclusive Agrifood Market Development: A guide to multi-stakeholder processes for 
linking small-scale producers to modern markets.   
  
Wallis, J. J. and North, D. C. (1986). Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American 
Economy, 1870-1970, ch 3. Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth. 
Engerman, S. L. and Gallman, R. E. Chicago, University of Chicago: 95-148. 
  
White, S. (2005). Emerging issues and debates in the reform of the business 
environment for small enterprise development. Small Enterprise Development 16(4): 
10-18. 
  
Wickham, P. A. (2006). Strategic Entrepreneurship. London, Financial Times/Prentice 
Hall. 
  
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. 
London, Macmillan. 
  
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, Macmillan. 
  
World Bank (2008). World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. 
Washington. 
  
Young, C., Sherman, N. P. and Rose, T. H. (1981). Cooperatives and Development: 
Agricultural Politics in Ghana and Uganda. Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press. 
